國立高雄大學圖資館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

圖資館首頁

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

國際混合寡占下貿易自由化、民營化與管制政策分析：環境稅、股權管制與併購 ...

國立高雄大學經濟管理研究所

國際混合寡占下貿易自由化、民營化與管制政策分析：環境稅、股權管制與併購 = TRADE LIBERALIZATION, PRIVATIZATION AND REGULATION POLICIES IN AN INTERNATIONAL MIXED OLIGOPOLY: ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION, EQUITY REGULATION, AND MERGER

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : 單行本
並列題名:	TRADE LIBERALIZATION, PRIVATIZATION AND REGULATION POLICIES IN AN INTERNATIONAL MIXED OLIGOPOLY: ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION, EQUITY REGULATION, AND MERGER
作者:	陳泰良,
其他團體作者:	國立高雄大學
出版地:	[高雄市]
出版者:	撰者;
出版年:	2008[民97]
面頁冊數:	56面圖，表 : 30公分;
標題:	貿易自由化
標題:	Trade Liberalization
電子資源:	http://handle.ncl.edu.tw/11296/ndltd/67074347150454153730
附註:	指導教授：王鳳生
附註:	參考書目：面41-43
摘要註:	近年來，發展中國家如中國、印度和東南亞國協等利用課稅、股權管制或民營化政策來保護國內產業、環境和追求社會福利；本論文將在一個國際混合寡占市場下的架構下分別探討環境稅、對外國投資廠商的股權管制與併購等議題。在環境議題上，Lai (2004)探討在一個雙占市場中貿易和環境稅的關係，而Ohori (2006)擴充Lai的模型至一混合雙占市場。我們在兩篇文獻基礎上探討當存在消費外部性造成環境損害時，不同寡占市場結構(純粹寡占、混合寡占)與財貨性質下最適環境稅率的訂定與貿易自由化對環境損害的影響。結果顯示，無論在雙占市場或是寡占市場，存在低效率的公營廠商下所課徵的環境稅高於純民營市場；此外，在市場高度開放後，純粹寡占市場相較於混合寡占市場，環境損害程度將減少。在股權管制議題上，我們在一國際混合寡占模型下討論最適民營化比例與股權管制的影響。我們發現嚴厲股權管制措施會增加民營企業產出、利潤、市場價格和社會福利，但會降低公營企業的產出；又隨著股權管制的增加，政府將提升民營化的程度，且廠商家數越高亦將提升政府民營化的程度；此外，我們證明出Fjell and Pal (1996)文中所指出的部份結論並非完全無誤，即無論外國廠商是否再投資於本國，公營廠商的產出將隨著外國私營廠商的進入而增加。最後，Méndez-Naya (2008)指出當部份廠商參與成為水平併購者之一且有利可圖，而非市場並構成唯一個獨佔市場時，合併的矛盾(merger paradox)是可被修正的。我們在一個國際混合寡占市場架構且廠商間生產水平異質產品下，發現在存在足夠併購誘因而達成併購時，大部分市不存在併購矛盾；對政府而言，當存在足夠誘因可達成併購時，藉由併購方式來進行民營化的策略將使福利高過公營廠商直接進行民營化的策略。 For developing countries or those in transition, to protect domestic firms, environment, and social welfare, the government always steps in to affect market, such as taxation, equity control/regulation or privatization. For instance, China, India and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) not only choose privatization policy, but have passed legislation which implements taxations on controlling pollution, limits private shareholding, and/or the upper limit of foreign investment. This thesis will consider the issues of public policy－environmental taxation, equity control on foreign competitors, and merger for partial privatization－in an international mixed oligopoly.Concerning the environmental issue, Lai (2004) examined trade and environmental policies in a pure duopoly market, while Ohori (2006) extended Lai’s work in a mixed duopoly model. We investigated the environment tax and trade liberalization with different market structures (pure oligopoly or mixed oligopoly) juxtaposing the substitutability of the goods (homogenous goods and differentiated goods), wherein environmental damage is associated with consumption. It shows that the environmental tax in mixed oligopoly is higher than in pure oligopoly irrespective of the properties of goods. In addition, it demonstrates that when the domestic market increases its openings, the tariff reduction does not always bring positive effects on the environment in mixed oligopoly; but, in pure oligopoly with homogeneous goods, the tariff reduction is bad for the environment.Subsequently, concerning the issue on equity control, we demonstrated that the

國際混合寡占下貿易自由化、民營化與管制政策分析：環境稅、股權管制與併購 = TRADE LIBERALIZATION, PRIVATIZATION AND REGULATION POLICIES IN AN INTERNATIONAL MIXED OLIGOPOLY: ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION, EQUITY REGULATION, AND MERGER
陳, 泰良

國際混合寡占下貿易自由化、民營化與管制政策分析：環境稅、股權管制與併購 = TRADE LIBERALIZATION, PRIVATIZATION AND REGULATION POLICIES IN AN INTERNATIONAL MIXED OLIGOPOLY: ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION, EQUITY REGULATION, AND MERGER / 陳泰良撰 - [高雄市] : 撰者, 2008[民97]. - 56面 ; 圖，表 ; 30公分.
指導教授：王鳳生參考書目：面41-43.
貿易自由化Trade Liberalization

國際混合寡占下貿易自由化、民營化與管制政策分析：環境稅、股權管制與併購 = TRADE LIBERALIZATION, PRIVATIZATION AND REGULATION POLICIES IN AN INTERNATIONAL MIXED OLIGOPOLY: ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION, EQUITY REGULATION, AND MERGER
LDR:05080nam0a2200289 450 001 133611
005 20170214094755.0
009 133611
010 0 $b 精裝
010 0 $b 平裝
100 $a 20170214y2008 k y0chiy09 b
101 1 $a chi $d chi $d eng
102 $a tw
105 $a ak am 000yy
200 1 $a 國際混合寡占下貿易自由化、民營化與管制政策分析：環境稅、股權管制與併購 $d TRADE LIBERALIZATION, PRIVATIZATION AND REGULATION POLICIES IN AN INTERNATIONAL MIXED OLIGOPOLY: ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION, EQUITY REGULATION, AND MERGER $f 陳泰良撰
210 $a [高雄市] $c 撰者 $d 2008[民97]
215 0 $a 56面 $c 圖，表 $d 30公分
300 $a 指導教授：王鳳生
300 $a 參考書目：面41-43
328 $a 碩士論文--國立高雄大學經濟管理研究所
330 $a 近年來，發展中國家如中國、印度和東南亞國協等利用課稅、股權管制或民營化政策來保護國內產業、環境和追求社會福利；本論文將在一個國際混合寡占市場下的架構下分別探討環境稅、對外國投資廠商的股權管制與併購等議題。在環境議題上，Lai (2004)探討在一個雙占市場中貿易和環境稅的關係，而Ohori (2006)擴充Lai的模型至一混合雙占市場。我們在兩篇文獻基礎上探討當存在消費外部性造成環境損害時，不同寡占市場結構(純粹寡占、混合寡占)與財貨性質下最適環境稅率的訂定與貿易自由化對環境損害的影響。結果顯示，無論在雙占市場或是寡占市場，存在低效率的公營廠商下所課徵的環境稅高於純民營市場；此外，在市場高度開放後，純粹寡占市場相較於混合寡占市場，環境損害程度將減少。在股權管制議題上，我們在一國際混合寡占模型下討論最適民營化比例與股權管制的影響。我們發現嚴厲股權管制措施會增加民營企業產出、利潤、市場價格和社會福利，但會降低公營企業的產出；又隨著股權管制的增加，政府將提升民營化的程度，且廠商家數越高亦將提升政府民營化的程度；此外，我們證明出Fjell and Pal (1996)文中所指出的部份結論並非完全無誤，即無論外國廠商是否再投資於本國，公營廠商的產出將隨著外國私營廠商的進入而增加。最後，Méndez-Naya (2008)指出當部份廠商參與成為水平併購者之一且有利可圖，而非市場並構成唯一個獨佔市場時，合併的矛盾(merger paradox)是可被修正的。我們在一個國際混合寡占市場架構且廠商間生產水平異質產品下，發現在存在足夠併購誘因而達成併購時，大部分市不存在併購矛盾；對政府而言，當存在足夠誘因可達成併購時，藉由併購方式來進行民營化的策略將使福利高過公營廠商直接進行民營化的策略。 For developing countries or those in transition, to protect domestic firms, environment, and social welfare, the government always steps in to affect market, such as taxation, equity control/regulation or privatization. For instance, China, India and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) not only choose privatization policy, but have passed legislation which implements taxations on controlling pollution, limits private shareholding, and/or the upper limit of foreign investment. This thesis will consider the issues of public policy－environmental taxation, equity control on foreign competitors, and merger for partial privatization－in an international mixed oligopoly.Concerning the environmental issue, Lai (2004) examined trade and environmental policies in a pure duopoly market, while Ohori (2006) extended Lai’s work in a mixed duopoly model. We investigated the environment tax and trade liberalization with different market structures (pure oligopoly or mixed oligopoly) juxtaposing the substitutability of the goods (homogenous goods and differentiated goods), wherein environmental damage is associated with consumption. It shows that the environmental tax in mixed oligopoly is higher than in pure oligopoly irrespective of the properties of goods. In addition, it demonstrates that when the domestic market increases its openings, the tariff reduction does not always bring positive effects on the environment in mixed oligopoly; but, in pure oligopoly with homogeneous goods, the tariff reduction is bad for the environment.Subsequently, concerning the issue on equity control, we demonstrated that the
510 1 $a TRADE LIBERALIZATION, PRIVATIZATION AND REGULATION POLICIES IN AN INTERNATIONAL MIXED OLIGOPOLY: ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION, EQUITY REGULATION, AND MERGER
610 0 $a 貿易自由化 $a 民營化 $a 環境稅 $a 股權控制 $a 併購
610 1 $a Trade Liberalization $a Privatization $a Environmental Taxation $a Equity Control $a Merger
681 $a 008M/0019 $b 301208 7553 $v 增訂八版
700 1 $a 陳 $b 泰良 $4 撰 $3 166102
712 0 2 $a 國立高雄大學 $b 經濟管理研究所 $3 166103
801 0 $a tw $b NUK $c 20081020 $g CCR
801 1 $a tw $b NUK $c 20081020 $g CCR
856 7 $z 電子資源 $2 http $u http://handle.ncl.edu.tw/11296/ndltd/67074347150454153730