董監事質押與銀行信用風險及績效之關係-以本土上市櫃商業銀行為例 = Th...
國立高雄大學經濟管理研究所

 

  • 董監事質押與銀行信用風險及績效之關係-以本土上市櫃商業銀行為例 = The Relationship among the Collateralized Shares, Credit Risk Management and Performance in the Taiwan Banking Industry
  • 紀錄類型: 書目-語言資料,印刷品 : 單行本
    並列題名: The Relationship among the Collateralized Shares, Credit Risk Management and Performance in the Taiwan Banking Industry
    作者: 謝明選,
    其他團體作者: 國立高雄大學
    出版地: [高雄市]
    出版者: 撰者;
    出版年: 2008[民97]
    面頁冊數: 66面圖,表 : 30公分;
    標題: 董監事質押
    標題: The collateralized shares
    電子資源: http://handle.ncl.edu.tw/11296/ndltd/64883611338593442056
    附註: 指導教授:陳怡凱、高蘭芬
    附註: 參考書目:面25-28
    摘要註: 摘要公司治理和銀行內部控管的關係已成為近年來重要的議題,而在中信金和中華銀的事件過後,董監事質押的因素已為金管會所重視並對銀行內部董監事比例加以規範,然而,目前在學術界中卻甚少有人針對此因素加以研究。董監事質押是否為銀行董監事濫用職權的誘因之ㄧ?當這些握有管理權的董監事將質押當作個人融資的方法時,會不會影響董監事對於銀行內部信用風險控管的態度?此為本研究之主要議題。本研究之實證資料來源自TEJ(the Taiwan Economic Journal)資料庫,研究母體為台灣本土上市櫃商業銀行,期間自1999年第四季至2007年第四季,共選取27家目前和曾經上市櫃之台灣本土銀商業行為樣本。研究方法使用敘述統計和VIF(Variance Inflation Factor)陳述資料的特性,並以penal data regression做為主要模型以期去除選取樣本間異質性的問題。本研究為一篇實證性質的文章,主要目的在於對董監事質押和銀行內部風險控管和獲利能力彼此之相關性有更深一層的了解。除了提供一個實證基礎,讓政府部門瞭解董監事質押是否是一個值得去監控的因素外,也能提供政府部門作為未來在政策制定方面之參考。 AbstractIn recent years, considerable concerns have arisen over the issue of corporate governance in banks’ supervision. One of the major issues has been investigated whether the sound mechanism of corporate governance benefits bank risk management and performance. The collateralized shares, serving stocks as collaterals, are one of financial leverage approaches and it is likely to be an incentive for block shareholders to misapply assets due to the deviation between the controlship and the ownership. The objective of this study is to examine whether the attitude of the board of directors toward risk will affect the bank risk and performance. The samples and examination periods are the quarterly data of 27 listed Commercial Banks on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and OTC market from 1999 to 2007. Empirical results support the claim that the collateralized shares may have contributed to a lower return due to a higher risk and they are in line with previous studies (Chiou et al., 2002; Kao and Chiou, 2002). In conclusion, the monitoring mechanism should enforce relatively regulations more strictly to avoid the agency problems. Especially to the insiders of influence such as board of directors or block shareholders, more strictly regulations and the disclosure of relatively information should be necessary. The result will be expected to lead to better understanding of the nature of the collateralized shares and laying the groundwork for realizing that is the collateralized shares worth monitoring. It may provide policy implication for the regulators in the later monitoring requirement.
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310001729907 博碩士論文區(二樓) 不外借資料 學位論文 008M/0019 301208 0463 2008 一般使用(Normal) 在架 0
310001729915 博碩士論文區(二樓) 不外借資料 學位論文 008M/0019 301208 0463 2008 c.2 一般使用(Normal) 在架 0
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