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Influencing the Supreme Court :Democratic accountability and the presidential threat to judicial independence .

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Influencing the Supreme Court :
其他題名:	Democratic accountability and the presidential threat to judicial independence .
作者:	Ebeid, Michael Fred.
面頁冊數:	193 p.
附註:	Director: David R. Mayhew.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 60-12, Section: A, page: 4583.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International60-12A.
標題:	Political Science, General.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9954321
ISBN:	0599575298

Influencing the Supreme Court :Democratic accountability and the presidential threat to judicial independence .
Ebeid, Michael Fred.

Influencing the Supreme Court :Democratic accountability and the presidential threat to judicial independence .[electronic resource] - 193 p.

Director: David R. Mayhew.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 1999.

Do presidents influence the Supreme Court's ideological composition in systematic and lasting ways? According to both conventional and scholarly wisdom, presidents customarily appoint justices who share their ideological vision. In an effort to demonstrate this empirically, most researchers have attempted to show that judicial outputs match presidential preferences. This strategy, however, is rife with difficulties. I defend an alternative approach that assesses a president's influence from the record of agreement among his Court appointees. Using data from Supreme Court cases decided between 1946 and 1995, 1 present comprehensive information about the agreement tendencies of justices appointed by presidents from Roosevelt to Clinton. This information—analyzed across all Court cases, non-unanimous cases, “important” cases, and by case issue area—serves as the basis on which I test two hypotheses: that justices appointed by the same president agree more frequently than justices appointed by different presidents, and that justices appointed by presidents of the same party agree more frequently than justices appointed by presidents of different parties. I find that certain presidents have had a notable impact on Court ideology but that presidential effects are not ubiquitous, overwhelming, or uniform across all contexts, and that over time, effects that initially exist tend to dissipate. Furthermore, party proves completely unhelpful as an explanation of judicial voting behavior. These results suggest that the presidential exercise of appointment power does not pose a significant threat to judicial independence and may, in effect, lead to a healthy balance between the Court's independence and its democratic accountability.

ISBN: 0599575298Subjects--Topical Terms:

212408
Political Science, General.

Influencing the Supreme Court :Democratic accountability and the presidential threat to judicial independence .
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