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Active and passive deterrence of income tax evasion.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Active and passive deterrence of income tax evasion.
作者:	Forest, Adam.
面頁冊數:	101 p.
附註:	Adviser: Steven M. Sheffrin.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 61-07, Section: A, page: 2823.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International61-07A.
標題:	Economics, General.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9980497
ISBN:	0599867035

Active and passive deterrence of income tax evasion.
Forest, Adam.

Active and passive deterrence of income tax evasion.[electronic resource] - 101 p.

Adviser: Steven M. Sheffrin.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Davis, 2000.

Two terms, “active deterrence” and “passive deterrence”, are introduced to describe methods that tax authorities could implement in an attempt to reduce income tax evasion. Active deterrence refers to methods that create fear and discourage noncompliance. For example, since reputation may not be important for success in a particular occupation, targeting a specific occupation category (e.g. non-manager/non-professional) with a higher probability of an audit, may reduce tax evasion. In contrast, passive deterrence refers to methods that create comfort and encourage compliance. Here, the hypothesis is that simplifying the tax system increases taxpayers' perceptions of fairness, which reduce tax evasion. Empirical tests are proposed to analyze whether these examples of both active and passive deterrence may be <italic>effective </italic> methods to increase taxpayer compliance.

ISBN: 0599867035Subjects--Topical Terms:

212429
Economics, General.

Active and passive deterrence of income tax evasion.
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