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Courts and legislatures in the "political thicket" :A study in comparative institutional capacity.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Courts and legislatures in the "political thicket" :
其他題名:	A study in comparative institutional capacity.
作者:	Buchman, Jeremy Alan.
面頁冊數:	262 p.
附註:	Adviser: Lucius Barker.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 60-08, Section: A, page: 3112.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International60-08A.
標題:	Political Science, General.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9943628
ISBN:	059945296X

Courts and legislatures in the "political thicket" :A study in comparative institutional capacity.
Buchman, Jeremy Alan.

Courts and legislatures in the "political thicket" :A study in comparative institutional capacity.[electronic resource] - 262 p.

Adviser: Lucius Barker.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 1999.

Because judgments of policy-making capacity require cross-institutional analysis, I also examine three institutional alternatives to the current voting rights enforcement regime, in which legislatures draw maps under substantial judicial scrutiny. Access to specialized information and a broad range of policy-making tools represent the primary advantages of the first alternative I consider, legislatures with unfettered discretion. These factors empower legislators to make the tradeoffs necessary to enact a districting plan; however, they also enable legislators to insulate themselves from electoral competition through redistricting. A second alternative, legislatures obliged to follow ostensibly neutral districting criteria, promises both to limit legislative discretion and to promote desirable districting characteristics. Insofar as such neutral criteria actually constrain mapmakers, they will have predictable and sometimes negative effects on identifiable groups. The third alternative, bipartisan districting commissions, shares the advantages of unfettered legislatures while also promising a process less marked by overt partisanship. But while commissions can counteract legislative tendencies to pursue partisan gerrymandering when circumstances allow, they may increase tendencies toward bipartisan gerrymandering.

ISBN: 059945296XSubjects--Topical Terms:

212408
Political Science, General.

Courts and legislatures in the "political thicket" :A study in comparative institutional capacity.
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520 # $a Because judgments of policy-making capacity require cross-institutional analysis, I also examine three institutional alternatives to the current voting rights enforcement regime, in which legislatures draw maps under substantial judicial scrutiny. Access to specialized information and a broad range of policy-making tools represent the primary advantages of the first alternative I consider, legislatures with unfettered discretion. These factors empower legislators to make the tradeoffs necessary to enact a districting plan; however, they also enable legislators to insulate themselves from electoral competition through redistricting. A second alternative, legislatures obliged to follow ostensibly neutral districting criteria, promises both to limit legislative discretion and to promote desirable districting characteristics. Insofar as such neutral criteria actually constrain mapmakers, they will have predictable and sometimes negative effects on identifiable groups. The third alternative, bipartisan districting commissions, shares the advantages of unfettered legislatures while also promising a process less marked by overt partisanship. But while commissions can counteract legislative tendencies to pursue partisan gerrymandering when circumstances allow, they may increase tendencies toward bipartisan gerrymandering.
520 # $a This study finds that a common perception of courts as highly constrained policy actors does not mesh comfortably with the role courts play in developing voting rights and redistricting policy. The most frequently noted limitations on judicial policy making—its reactive character and a lack of ability to enforce decisions—either are irrelevant to redistricting, are offset in some measure by endogenously determined judicial powers, or can be readily circumvented in practice. The factors with the most substantial effects on judicial performance in redistricting are those concerning the raw materials (judges' specialized knowledge and gaps therein, sources of information available to judges) and the tools of policy making.
520 # $a This thesis examines judicial performance in redistricting through the lens of institutional policy-making capacity. Rather than focus on doctrinal development or the effects of changes in voting rights enforcement on minority representation, I take a step back and ask a crucial, yet overlooked, question: are federal courts institutionally well-equipped, relative to legislatures and other institutional alternatives, to formulate redistricting policy?
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