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Legislative-judicial relations and strategic information exchange :Congressional amicus activity at the Supreme Court.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Legislative-judicial relations and strategic information exchange :
其他題名:	Congressional amicus activity at the Supreme Court.
作者:	Paine, Rachel.
面頁冊數:	236 p.
附註:	Director: Forrest Maltzmann.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 62-11, Section: A, page: 3924.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International62-11A.
標題:	Political Science, General.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3032761
ISBN:	0493452591

Legislative-judicial relations and strategic information exchange :Congressional amicus activity at the Supreme Court.
Paine, Rachel.

Legislative-judicial relations and strategic information exchange :Congressional amicus activity at the Supreme Court.[electronic resource] - 236 p.

Director: Forrest Maltzmann.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The George Washington University, 2002.

I propose that <italic>amicus curiae</italic> briefs submitted by members of Congress may serve as a tool of legislative judicial communication. To explore the use of <italic>amicus</italic> briefs and the extent to which they serve as informational tools that facilitate communication between the branches, I examine which members of Congress participate as <italic>amici </italic>, which cases are most likely to generate congressional participation, and the motivations that prompt legislators to appear as <italic>amici</italic>, as well as whether legislative briefs influence the decisions of the collective Court as well as the voting patterns of individual justices. The quantitative data analysis examines all legislative briefs submitted between 1980 and 1997, all cases heard and decided by the Court from 1980 to 1997, and all members of Congress who served during this time period. This data analysis is supplemented by a series of in-depth interviews conducted with members of Congress and legislative staff from both the House and Senate.

ISBN: 0493452591Subjects--Topical Terms:

212408
Political Science, General.

Legislative-judicial relations and strategic information exchange :Congressional amicus activity at the Supreme Court.
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520 # $a I propose that <italic>amicus curiae</italic> briefs submitted by members of Congress may serve as a tool of legislative judicial communication. To explore the use of <italic>amicus</italic> briefs and the extent to which they serve as informational tools that facilitate communication between the branches, I examine which members of Congress participate as <italic>amici </italic>, which cases are most likely to generate congressional participation, and the motivations that prompt legislators to appear as <italic>amici</italic>, as well as whether legislative briefs influence the decisions of the collective Court as well as the voting patterns of individual justices. The quantitative data analysis examines all legislative briefs submitted between 1980 and 1997, all cases heard and decided by the Court from 1980 to 1997, and all members of Congress who served during this time period. This data analysis is supplemented by a series of in-depth interviews conducted with members of Congress and legislative staff from both the House and Senate.
520 # $a Recent game-theoretic models of legislative judicial relations have suggested that the Supreme Court attempts to avoid Congressional reversal by constructing judicial opinions that reflect the preferences of Congress. These “separation-of-powers” models typically assume that the Supreme Court possesses complete and perfect information about congressional preferences and generally disregard the costs associated with congressional action to override judicial decisions (Marks 1989, Gely and Spiller 1990, Eskridge 1991a, 1991b, Ferejohn and Weingast 1992, Spiller and Gely 1992). I challenge these assumptions. If the Court operates in a constrained decision-making environment, it is important to determine how the Court gains information about the distribution of preferences in Congress and the likelihood of an override attempt.
520 # $a The results indicate that legislators use <italic>amicus</italic> briefs to pursue policy goals that they are unable to attain within Congress. In addition, members strategically choose cases that offer them the greatest leverage at the Court. The Supreme Court, in turn, is generally unresponsive to legislative briefs unless the macro-level political environment favors legislative reaction. Thus, both members of Congress and Supreme Court justices are strategic, although the political constraints on the Court and the conditions that prompt judicial response are inconsistent with separation-of-powers models.
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