國立高雄大學圖資館 |

登入

回首頁

Essays in comparative political institutions. An adverse selection model of terrorism :Theory and evidence. Constituency service, the incumbency advantage, and divided delegations in multi-member and single-member districts. Informative precedent and intra-judicial communication.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in comparative political institutions. An adverse selection model of terrorism :
其他題名:	Theory and evidence. Constituency service, the incumbency advantage, and divided delegations in multi-member and single-member districts. Informative precedent and intra-judicial communication.
作者:	Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan Leigh.
面頁冊數:	155 p.
附註:	Chair: Kenneth Shepsle.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-05, Section: A, page: 1827.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-05A.
標題:	Political Science, General.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3091519
ISBN:	049639228X

Essays in comparative political institutions. An adverse selection model of terrorism :Theory and evidence. Constituency service, the incumbency advantage, and divided delegations in multi-member and single-member districts. Informative precedent and intra-judicial communication.
Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan Leigh.

Essays in comparative political institutions. An adverse selection model of terrorism :Theory and evidence. Constituency service, the incumbency advantage, and divided delegations in multi-member and single-member districts. Informative precedent and intra-judicial communication. [electronic resource] - 155 p.

Chair: Kenneth Shepsle.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2003.

In the first essay I argue that when governments make concessions, only moderate terrorists accept, leaving extremists in control. Nonetheless, the ex ante expected level of terror decreases following concessions because the government's probability of eradicating terror improves as a result of a decrease in active terrorist cells and the collusion of former terrorists. However, should government couterterror fail, the increased radicalization leads to an ex post increase in violence. This suggests that the empirical observation that concessions lead to more violence is the spurious result of selection bias caused by focusing on those cases where terror continued, and thus counterterror failed. The model yields hypotheses regarding terrorist strategies and the likelihood of concessions across regime types, the effect of sources of funding on patterns of violence, the terms of concessions, and incentives for moderate terrorists to recruit extremists. I present five cases: Palestinian terrorists, Basque separatists (ETA), the IRA, Quebec separatists (FLQ), and Zionist terrorists in British Mandate Palestine.

ISBN: 049639228XSubjects--Topical Terms:

212408
Political Science, General.

Essays in comparative political institutions. An adverse selection model of terrorism :Theory and evidence. Constituency service, the incumbency advantage, and divided delegations in multi-member and single-member districts. Informative precedent and intra-judicial communication.
LDR:03620nmm _2200277 _450 001 161958
005 20051017073355.5
008 230606s2003 eng d
020 $a 049639228X
035 $a 00148459
035 $a 161958
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 0 $a Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan Leigh. $3 227054
245 1 0 $a Essays in comparative political institutions. An adverse selection model of terrorism : $b Theory and evidence. Constituency service, the incumbency advantage, and divided delegations in multi-member and single-member districts. Informative precedent and intra-judicial communication. $h [electronic resource]
300 $a 155 p.
500 $a Chair: Kenneth Shepsle.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-05, Section: A, page: 1827.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2003.
520 # $a In the first essay I argue that when governments make concessions, only moderate terrorists accept, leaving extremists in control. Nonetheless, the ex ante expected level of terror decreases following concessions because the government's probability of eradicating terror improves as a result of a decrease in active terrorist cells and the collusion of former terrorists. However, should government couterterror fail, the increased radicalization leads to an ex post increase in violence. This suggests that the empirical observation that concessions lead to more violence is the spurious result of selection bias caused by focusing on those cases where terror continued, and thus counterterror failed. The model yields hypotheses regarding terrorist strategies and the likelihood of concessions across regime types, the effect of sources of funding on patterns of violence, the terms of concessions, and incentives for moderate terrorists to recruit extremists. I present five cases: Palestinian terrorists, Basque separatists (ETA), the IRA, Quebec separatists (FLQ), and Zionist terrorists in British Mandate Palestine.
520 # $a In the second essay I model the comparative effects of multi-member (MMD) and single-member districts (SMD). Voters face both moral hazard and learning problems in assessing legislators' effort and skill. Voters learn less in MMDs be cause there are multiple representatives. As a result, the model predicts: legislators from MMDs do less constituency service, the incumbency advantage is weaker in MMDs than in SMDs, decreasing effort with tenure is present in both systems but attenuated in MMDs, there is less constituency service and a weaker incumbency advantage in unified delegations than in divided delegations, and more intensely partisan voters select unified delegations.
520 # $a The final essay presents a model of judicial decision-making in which precedent is useful to policy-oriented appellate judges because it improves the accuracy with which they communicate legal rules to trial judges. The model yields hypotheses regarding conditions under which judges will break with precedent, the constraining effect of precedent on judicial decision-making, the voting behavior of Supreme Court Justices, the relationship between a precedent's age and authority, the effect of legal complexity on deference to precedent, the relative stability of rules and standards, and patterns of legal evolution.
590 $a School code: 0084.
650 # 0 $a Political Science, General. $3 212408
710 0 # $a Harvard University. $3 212445
773 0 # $g 64-05A. $t Dissertation Abstracts International
790 $a 0084
790 1 0 $a Shepsle, Kenneth, $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2003
856 4 0 $u http://libsw.nuk.edu.tw/login?url=http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3091519 $z http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3091519