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Emergence in electoral politics.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Emergence in electoral politics.
作者:	Fowler, James Henry, III.
面頁冊數:	116 p.
附註:	Chair: Kenneth Shepsle.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-05, Section: A, page: 1829.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-05A.
標題:	Political Science, General.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3091556
ISBN:	0496392654

Emergence in electoral politics.
Fowler, James Henry, III.

Emergence in electoral politics. [electronic resource] - 116 p.

Chair: Kenneth Shepsle.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2003.

Rational explanations of voting have typically focused on static models of turnout that rely on the pivotal motivation to vote in a single election. Chapter 3 develops a dynamic decision-theoretic model of turnout, in which individuals maximize their subjective expected utility in a context of repeated elections. In the model a nonnegative signaling motivation to vote exists for all citizens, regardless of their ideology or beliefs about the closeness of the election, and is proportional to a citizen's external efficacy, patience, and electoral pessimism. I find tentative support for all three effects in an empirical model of turnout using NES data (1976--1988). This chapter suggests that the signaling motivation may play a role in a citizen's decision to vote.

ISBN: 0496392654Subjects--Topical Terms:

212408
Political Science, General.

Emergence in electoral politics.
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520 # $a Rational explanations of voting have typically focused on static models of turnout that rely on the pivotal motivation to vote in a single election. Chapter 3 develops a dynamic decision-theoretic model of turnout, in which individuals maximize their subjective expected utility in a context of repeated elections. In the model a nonnegative signaling motivation to vote exists for all citizens, regardless of their ideology or beliefs about the closeness of the election, and is proportional to a citizen's external efficacy, patience, and electoral pessimism. I find tentative support for all three effects in an empirical model of turnout using NES data (1976--1988). This chapter suggests that the signaling motivation may play a role in a citizen's decision to vote.
520 # $a This thesis is a collection of three essays that explore the importance of interaction effects in electoral politics. Chapter 1 investigates between-voter interactions in a social network model of turnout. It shows that if (1) there is a small probability that voters imitate the behavior of one of their acquaintances, and (2) individuals are closely connected to others in a population (the "small-world" effect), then a single voting decision may affect dozens of other voters in a "turnout cascade." If people tend to be ideologically similar to other people they are connected to, then these turnout cascades will produce net favorable results for their favorite candidate. By changing more than one vote with one's own turnout decision, the turnout incentive is thus substantially larger than previously thought. I analyze conditions that are favorable to turnout cascades and show that the effect is consistent with real social network data from Huckfeldt and Sprague's South Bend and Indianapolis-St. Louis election surveys. I also suggest that turnout cascades may help explain over-reporting of turnout and the ubiquitous belief in a duty to vote.
520 # $a Using simple formal theories of two-party competition in a single dimension, chapter 2 develops a theory of dynamic responsiveness. This theory suggests that parties react to past elections in the following way: winning parties choose candidates that are more extreme and losing parties choose candidates that are more moderate. Moreover, the size of past victories matters. Close elections yield little change, but landslides yield large changes in the candidates offered by both parties. I test this theory by analyzing the relationship between Republican vote share in US Senate elections and the ideology of candidates offered in the subsequent election. The results suggest that Republican (Democratic) victories in past elections yield candidates that are more (less) conservative in subsequent elections, and the effect is proportional to the margin of victory. I replicate this analysis for US Presidential elections using three different measures of ideology and find weak support for the same effect. This suggests that parties, candidates, and/or voters pay attention to past election returns and change their behavior in a way that privileges winning party candidates that are more extreme and losing party candidates that are more moderate in the next election.
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