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Policy balancing in comparative context :Institutional mediation of voter behavior.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Policy balancing in comparative context :
其他題名:	Institutional mediation of voter behavior.
作者:	Kedar, Orit.
面頁冊數:	135 p.
附註:	Adviser: Gary King.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-05, Section: A, page: 1831.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-05A.
標題:	Political Science, General.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3091596
ISBN:	0496393057

Policy balancing in comparative context :Institutional mediation of voter behavior.
Kedar, Orit.

Policy balancing in comparative context :Institutional mediation of voter behavior. [electronic resource] - 135 p.

Adviser: Gary King.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2003.

This work develops and tests a theory of issue voting. I demonstrate that in seeking to affect policy outcomes, voters do not necessarily vote for the party whose policy positions are closest to the issue positions of the voters themselves, but rather reward parties that pull policy outcomes in a preferred direction. In democracies where policy outcomes are a product of compromises among multiple agents, voters understand that their vote will be 'diluted' and compensate for the dilution by voting for parties whose policy positions are more extreme than the positions of the voters themselves. This points to an institutional effect on voter behavior: voters employ a different strategy depending on the institutional mechanisms that convert votes to policy outcomes. I build on this insight to reinterpret an ongoing debate between directional and proximity theories of voting. I show that directional voting is in fact policy-oriented voting, and that variation in types of democracies and types of individuals account for proximity or directional---policy-oriented---voting, both of which are special cases of the model I develop. Furthermore, I provide a micro-foundational explanation for a persistent empirical finding unaccounted for theoretically in political science---menu dependence in voter choice. To test my theory, I conduct an empirical analysis of voting behavior in five parliamentary democracies that vary in their institutional design: Norway, the Netherlands, and New Zealand represent power-sharing systems, and Britain and Canada represent majoritarian systems. Finally, I extend my argument to policy balancing in presidential systems. The extension to the presidential case, accompanied by analysis of data from the U.S., allows me to put studies of policy moderation by American voters in comparative context. I show that arguments about policy balancing under the institutional mechanisms idiosyncratic to the U.S. are a special case of a broader set of policy-balancing motivations that hold across institutional designs.

ISBN: 0496393057Subjects--Topical Terms:

212408
Political Science, General.

Policy balancing in comparative context :Institutional mediation of voter behavior.
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