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Taxability and state support of economic activity.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Taxability and state support of economic activity.
作者:	Gehlbach, Scott Gerald.
面頁冊數:	150 p.
附註:	Chair: Henry E. Brady.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-09, Section: A, page: 3457.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-09A.
標題:	Political Science, General.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3105218
ISBN:	0496527851

Taxability and state support of economic activity.
Gehlbach, Scott Gerald.

Taxability and state support of economic activity. [electronic resource] - 150 p.

Chair: Henry E. Brady.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2003.

At the core of this dissertation is a simple idea: political actors, interested in tax revenues, have an incentive to support economic activity which is more taxable, i.e. activity from which the state can more easily extract revenues. A series of formal models explores the limitations and consequences of this argument.

ISBN: 0496527851Subjects--Topical Terms:

212408
Political Science, General.

Taxability and state support of economic activity.
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520 # $a At the core of this dissertation is a simple idea: political actors, interested in tax revenues, have an incentive to support economic activity which is more taxable, i.e. activity from which the state can more easily extract revenues. A series of formal models explores the limitations and consequences of this argument.
520 # $a The first set of models demonstrates the key role played by the commitment power of the state: economic actors have an incentive to hide revenues from the state when rulers are unable to commit to leaving behind a portion of unhidden production, and need to be compensated for forgoing that option when the state can commit. Given that some actors will find it easier to hide revenues than others, state support will typically favor economic activity which is more taxable. Application of these models to the analysis of survey data suggests that business-state relations in the postcommunist world are characterized by commitment failures on the part of the state.
520 # $a The second set of models takes the incentive of the state to support more taxable activity as given, exploring the consequences of this incentive when factors of production are mobile across sectors which differ in their taxability: political economies will organize themselves into equilibria where states support economic activity because resources are allocated to it, which in turn encourages that allocation. Such a mechanism, together with large differences in relative taxability across states, may have contributed to the development of a "great divide" in political-economic performance between Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
520 # $a While the first two sets of models assume a revenue-maximizing ruler, the third posits an elected politician for whom competence in supporting economic activity and producing tax revenues is important for reelection. In an electoral context, higher taxability does not unambiguously translate into more support. Rather, the degree to which taxability matters will depend on such institutional factors as the value that voters place on the goods and transfers provided by the state, and the overall tax capacity of the state. Analysis of survey data from postcommunist states implies that the electoral model fits best for those countries with strong democracies.
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