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Empirical essays on patronage, decentralization, and distributive politics (Korea).

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Empirical essays on patronage, decentralization, and distributive politics (Korea).
作者:	Park, No-Wook.
面頁冊數:	88 p.
附註:	Chair: Rohini Somanathan.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-09, Section: A, page: 3410.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-09A.
標題:	Economics, Finance.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3105997
ISBN:	0496535633

Empirical essays on patronage, decentralization, and distributive politics (Korea).
Park, No-Wook.

Empirical essays on patronage, decentralization, and distributive politics (Korea). [electronic resource] - 88 p.

Chair: Rohini Somanathan.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2003.

The first chapter examines how presidential changes affect position assignments of Korean public prosecutors by utilizing personnel data on them during 1992--2000. After controlling for unobservable but fixed characteristics of individual prosecutors, I find that prosecutors who shared birth and school environments with the incumbent president were about twice as likely to be assigned to a variety of influential positions.

ISBN: 0496535633Subjects--Topical Terms:

212585
Economics, Finance.

Empirical essays on patronage, decentralization, and distributive politics (Korea).
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520 # $a The first chapter examines how presidential changes affect position assignments of Korean public prosecutors by utilizing personnel data on them during 1992--2000. After controlling for unobservable but fixed characteristics of individual prosecutors, I find that prosecutors who shared birth and school environments with the incumbent president were about twice as likely to be assigned to a variety of influential positions.
520 # $a The second chapter examines whether political factors are more active in the distributive policy after decentralization reforms. Utilizing the resumption of local elections in Korea as an exogenous institutional change and constructing city, county, and district level panel data during 1991--1999, I find that political factors become more active in the distribution of intergovernmental transfers after decentralization reforms. In particular, districts closely contested in elections receive favorable distribution of intergovernmental transfers after decentralization.
520 # $a The third chapter examines whether elected local officials behave differently in their fiscal management as compared to appointed ones. For empirical purpose, fiscal data of Korean local governments during 1991--1999 is employed and the resumption of local elections in 1995 is utilized as a natural experiment. After constructing some fiscal indices reflecting ways of fiscal managements, I find that elected local officials enhance their fiscal independence by raising more non-tax revenues relative to local tax revenues and face softer budget constraints. In particular, local officials in closely contested districts face softer budget constraints and decrease their fiscal independence.
520 # $a This dissertation addresses three questions: existence of patronage in the public administration, the effect of decentralization on distributive politics, and the effect of political decentralization on the fiscal management of local governments. The fist chapter provides unique evidence on parochial corruption, the second chapter presents a possibility that decentralization process may activate political factors in distribution of government-controlled resources, and the third chapter suggests that elected local officials may behave differently in the fiscal management of local governments.
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