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Choosing to cooperate :States, secretariats and the politics of institutional design.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Choosing to cooperate :
其他題名:	States, secretariats and the politics of institutional design.
作者:	Hamlet, Lawrence Lambert.
面頁冊數:	461 p.
附註:	Advisers: Lisa Martin; Jeffry Frieden; Celeste Wallander.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-09, Section: A, page: 3469.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-09A.
標題:	Political Science, International Law and Relations.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3106642
ISBN:	0496542079

Choosing to cooperate :States, secretariats and the politics of institutional design.
Hamlet, Lawrence Lambert.

Choosing to cooperate :States, secretariats and the politics of institutional design. [electronic resource] - 461 p.

Advisers: Lisa Martin; Jeffry Frieden; Celeste Wallander.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2003.

How do states design and use international organizations (IOs) and why are so many IOs operationally inefficient? My dissertation seeks to answer this question by focusing on the secretariats of IOs, and analyzing how states' incentives to delegate power to 10 secretariats---yet withhold power from IO secretariats when necessary in order to maintain control---affect secretariat design.

ISBN: 0496542079Subjects--Topical Terms:

212542
Political Science, International Law and Relations.

Choosing to cooperate :States, secretariats and the politics of institutional design.
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500 $a Advisers: Lisa Martin; Jeffry Frieden; Celeste Wallander.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-09, Section: A, page: 3469.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2003.
520 # $a How do states design and use international organizations (IOs) and why are so many IOs operationally inefficient? My dissertation seeks to answer this question by focusing on the secretariats of IOs, and analyzing how states' incentives to delegate power to 10 secretariats---yet withhold power from IO secretariats when necessary in order to maintain control---affect secretariat design.
520 # $a My dissertation highlights the trade-off states face in designing IO secretariats. States must weigh the benefits of creating powerful secretariats against the costs that such secretariats might use their power in undesired ways. Applying rationalist theories of institutions, I argue that states have incentives to use secretariats to solve interstate collective action problems. Thus, states create and empower secretariats to alleviate the dominant cooperation problems in an issue area. However, applying principal-agent theory, I argue that states also have incentives to maintain control over secretariats. To maintain control, states use control mechanisms to limit secretariat resources and authority. Such control mechanisms can impair the secretariat's ability to perform its delegated tasks efficiently. Thus, secretariat design varies according to the type and intensity of the collective action problem that states ask secretariats to solve, and according to how much states limit the scope of secretariat action. Furthermore, inasmuch as state efforts to control secretariats can impair secretariats' operational capacity, rational delegation can produce inefficient secretariats. Such secretariats are politically efficient solutions for states to the challenge of crafting effective yet controlled secretariats.
520 # $a To evaluate my theory, I conduct comparative case studies of the secretariats of six IOs, selected to maximize variation on the type of collective action problem. I study the World Bank, the European Union's Council of Ministers, NATO, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, the International Telecommunication Union, and the United Nations. The case studies are based on 135 interviews with secretariat officials and national elites, over 100 primary documents from each organization and secondary literature. I find that my theory largely explains the design characteristics of the secretariats I examine; however, competing explanations focusing on the importance of domestic politics also receive support in some of my cases.
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790 1 0 $a Martin, Lisa, $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Wallander, Celeste, $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2003
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