國立高雄大學圖資館 |

登入

回首頁

Too close for comfort :Elite cues and strategic voting in multi-candidate elections.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Too close for comfort :
其他題名:	Elite cues and strategic voting in multi-candidate elections.
作者:	Merolla, Jennifer Lee.
面頁冊數:	404 p.
附註:	Chair: John H. Aldrich.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-09, Section: A, page: 3460.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-09A.
標題:	Political Science, General.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3106807
ISBN:	0496543717

Too close for comfort :Elite cues and strategic voting in multi-candidate elections.
Merolla, Jennifer Lee.

Too close for comfort :Elite cues and strategic voting in multi-candidate elections. [electronic resource] - 404 p.

Chair: John H. Aldrich.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duke University, 2003.

Having demonstrated the optimal use of elite cues, I then show that elite messages have a substantial impact on the likelihood of voting strategically using data from the 2000 U.S. Presidential election and from an experiment. I also demonstrate how the effectiveness of strategic voting appeals varies according to contextual factors, such as the sponsor, type, and tone of the message, by one's level of political sophistication, and by the presence of a counter-strategic voting message.

ISBN: 0496543717Subjects--Topical Terms:

212408
Political Science, General.

Too close for comfort :Elite cues and strategic voting in multi-candidate elections.
LDR:03076nmm _2200301 _450 001 162126
005 20051017073413.5
008 230606s2003 eng d
020 $a 0496543717
035 $a 00148627
035 $a 162126
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 0 $a Merolla, Jennifer Lee. $3 227239
245 1 0 $a Too close for comfort : $b Elite cues and strategic voting in multi-candidate elections. $h [electronic resource]
300 $a 404 p.
500 $a Chair: John H. Aldrich.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-09, Section: A, page: 3460.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duke University, 2003.
520 # $a Having demonstrated the optimal use of elite cues, I then show that elite messages have a substantial impact on the likelihood of voting strategically using data from the 2000 U.S. Presidential election and from an experiment. I also demonstrate how the effectiveness of strategic voting appeals varies according to contextual factors, such as the sponsor, type, and tone of the message, by one's level of political sophistication, and by the presence of a counter-strategic voting message.
520 # $a In multi-candidate elections, we often witness a significant proportion of minor party supporters abandoning their favorite candidate, so as not to cast a "wasted vote." While the logic behind this behavior makes sense intuitively, the probability that one individual will change the outcome of the election will always be close to zero in a large electorate. If voters are aware of this, then why do we witness strategic voting in the electorate?
520 # $a My explanation to this puzzle is that political elites play a role in persuading voters to engage in strategic behavior. In line with rational choice scholars, I argue that elites might influence the perception of being decisive. I also argue that elites might foment strategic voting by affecting the utility toward the second and third preference of minor party supporters.
520 # $a The first part of the dissertation outlines the optimal strategies that elites might use to sway minor party supporters to abandon their first preference. In particular, I argue that candidates, parties, and interest groups should use different types of strategies in their appeals to minor party supporters and test the hypotheses with data from the 2000 U.S. presidential election.
520 # $a This project is distinct in that no existing studies of strategic voting have systematically examined the use of elite cues in multi-candidate elections. Furthermore, the project ties together the more formal literature on strategic voting with work on the effectiveness of different types of messages in public opinion and political psychology research.
590 $a School code: 0066.
650 # 0 $a Political Science, General. $3 212408
710 0 # $a Duke University. $3 226880
773 0 # $g 64-09A. $t Dissertation Abstracts International
790 $a 0066
790 1 0 $a Aldrich, John H., $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2003
856 4 0 $u http://libsw.nuk.edu.tw/login?url=http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3106807 $z http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3106807