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Intergovernmental fiscal relations in developing countries :Brazil, South Africa, Peru, and Senegal (1980--present)

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Intergovernmental fiscal relations in developing countries :
其他題名:	Brazil, South Africa, Peru, and Senegal (1980--present)
作者:	Dickovick, James Tyler.
面頁冊數:	356 p.
附註:	Adviser: Jeffrey I. Herbst.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-02, Section: A, page: 0677.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International65-02A.
標題:	Political Science, General.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3123421
ISBN:	0496707329

Intergovernmental fiscal relations in developing countries :Brazil, South Africa, Peru, and Senegal (1980--present)
Dickovick, James Tyler.

Intergovernmental fiscal relations in developing countries :Brazil, South Africa, Peru, and Senegal (1980--present) [electronic resource] - 356 p.

Adviser: Jeffrey I. Herbst.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Princeton University, 2004.

Changes in the political economy drive changes in subnational fiscal autonomy. The electoral decline of governing parties leads central governments to increase the autonomy of subnational governments. As presidents weaken, they are more susceptible to decentralizing logics, especially if the president's party is strongly represented at the subnational level. This observation holds across the range of countries. Once granted, however, subnational fiscal autonomy is "sticky", and difficult to reverse. Presidents can recentralize only when they have extraordinary governing opportunities. Such opportunities are presented by economic crisis, especially hyperinflation. Presidents who resolve macroeconomic crises can reduce the fiscal autonomy of subnational governments. In short, decline leads to decentralization and crisis to centralization.

ISBN: 0496707329Subjects--Topical Terms:

212408
Political Science, General.

Intergovernmental fiscal relations in developing countries :Brazil, South Africa, Peru, and Senegal (1980--present)
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520 # $a Changes in the political economy drive changes in subnational fiscal autonomy. The electoral decline of governing parties leads central governments to increase the autonomy of subnational governments. As presidents weaken, they are more susceptible to decentralizing logics, especially if the president's party is strongly represented at the subnational level. This observation holds across the range of countries. Once granted, however, subnational fiscal autonomy is "sticky", and difficult to reverse. Presidents can recentralize only when they have extraordinary governing opportunities. Such opportunities are presented by economic crisis, especially hyperinflation. Presidents who resolve macroeconomic crises can reduce the fiscal autonomy of subnational governments. In short, decline leads to decentralization and crisis to centralization.
520 # $a Decline and crisis shape each of the three issue areas of subnational fiscal autonomy. Yet each area has its own logic, its own set of players and its own institutional environment. Revenue autonomy is generally contested between the national executive and legislative branches. Expenditure autonomy is largely shaped within the state. Contractual autonomy is mainly the outcome of negotiations between national and subnational elected officials. Presidents are a consistent player in all interactions, but the president's interlocutors vary by issue area, and subnational fiscal autonomy varies from one area to another as well.
520 # $a Policy issues permeate this study of IGFR, and the conceptual and theoretical developments forwarded here will assist scholars in understanding not only what causes changes in IGFR, but also the consequences of change.
520 # $a Why do central governments decentralize power? And under what conditions can they reverse the decentralization of power? This dissertation examines changing patterns in intergovernmental fiscal relations (IGFR) in four countries: Brazil, South Africa, Peru, and Senegal, from 1980 to the present. More specifically, subnational fiscal autonomy is the outcome of interest; this is preferred to more common, yet more limited, arguments about decentralization. Subnational fiscal autonomy is evaluated in three issue areas: revenue autonomy, expenditure autonomy, and contractual autonomy. These three areas are examined thematically and comparatively, rather than in a set of country monographs.
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