國立高雄大學圖資館 |

登入

回首頁

Three essays in political economy

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Three essays in political economy
作者:	Kim, Kwang-ho.
面頁冊數:	113 p.
附註:	Adviser: Antonio Merlo.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-03, Section: A, page: 1062.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International65-03A.
標題:	Economics, Theory.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3125846
ISBN:	0496731351

Three essays in political economy
Kim, Kwang-ho.

Three essays in political economy [electronic resource] - 113 p.

Adviser: Antonio Merlo.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2004.

This dissertation consists of three essays in political economy. In Chapter 1, we analyze the inefficiency that may arise in the form of reverse discrimination in the presence of favoritism or nepotism. Favoritism is typically associated with inefficient transfers to the core support of the incumbent government. But inefficiency opposite in nature may also arise through the electoral process in a political environment where favoritism is pervasive. We show that if the policy maker is sufficiently office seeking, a socially efficient action may never be taken if it yields benefits to his core support due to reputational concerns. Hence, the core support of the incumbent may fare worse than other groups. We also consider the implications of policies such as anti-nepotism laws or term limits in the presence of favoritism. In Chapter 2, we model endogenous party membership and party platforms when party activists have different policy preferences and different priorities. In our model, party activists are heterogeneous not only in their ideal policy but also in their intensity to pursue policy issues vis-a-vis the spoils from office. We provide existence and characterization results for an equilibrium in which party activists choose their party affiliation with correct anticipation of the choices by others, and the resulting party platforms are consistent with the affiliation choice. This model offers an explanation for the overlaps in ideology between political parties. It also provides insights into the inner composition of political parties with different sizes. In Chapter 3, we analyze the voting behavior of partisan voters in a two-party presidential system when voters care about candidates' valence characteristics as well as policy issues. We show that since the president has a larger influence over policy than a single representative, partisan voters are more likely to vote for their own party's candidate in the presidential election than in the legislative election. We also show that partisan voters are more likely to vote for their own party's candidate in legislative elections when the incumbent president is from the opponent party, than when he is from their own party. We provide some evidence that supports these findings.

ISBN: 0496731351Subjects--Topical Terms:

212740
Economics, Theory.

Three essays in political economy
LDR:03225nmm _2200277 _450 001 162491
005 20051017073452.5
008 230606s2004 eng d
020 $a 0496731351
035 $a 00148992
035 $a 162491
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 0 $a Kim, Kwang-ho. $3 227632
245 1 0 $a Three essays in political economy $h [electronic resource]
300 $a 113 p.
500 $a Adviser: Antonio Merlo.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-03, Section: A, page: 1062.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2004.
520 # $a This dissertation consists of three essays in political economy. In Chapter 1, we analyze the inefficiency that may arise in the form of reverse discrimination in the presence of favoritism or nepotism. Favoritism is typically associated with inefficient transfers to the core support of the incumbent government. But inefficiency opposite in nature may also arise through the electoral process in a political environment where favoritism is pervasive. We show that if the policy maker is sufficiently office seeking, a socially efficient action may never be taken if it yields benefits to his core support due to reputational concerns. Hence, the core support of the incumbent may fare worse than other groups. We also consider the implications of policies such as anti-nepotism laws or term limits in the presence of favoritism. In Chapter 2, we model endogenous party membership and party platforms when party activists have different policy preferences and different priorities. In our model, party activists are heterogeneous not only in their ideal policy but also in their intensity to pursue policy issues vis-a-vis the spoils from office. We provide existence and characterization results for an equilibrium in which party activists choose their party affiliation with correct anticipation of the choices by others, and the resulting party platforms are consistent with the affiliation choice. This model offers an explanation for the overlaps in ideology between political parties. It also provides insights into the inner composition of political parties with different sizes. In Chapter 3, we analyze the voting behavior of partisan voters in a two-party presidential system when voters care about candidates' valence characteristics as well as policy issues. We show that since the president has a larger influence over policy than a single representative, partisan voters are more likely to vote for their own party's candidate in the presidential election than in the legislative election. We also show that partisan voters are more likely to vote for their own party's candidate in legislative elections when the incumbent president is from the opponent party, than when he is from their own party. We provide some evidence that supports these findings.
590 $a School code: 0175.
650 # 0 $a Economics, Theory. $3 212740
650 # 0 $a Political Science, General. $3 212408
690 $a 0511
690 $a 0615
710 0 # $a University of Pennsylvania. $3 212781
773 0 # $g 65-03A. $t Dissertation Abstracts International
790 $a 0175
790 1 0 $a Merlo, Antonio, $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2004
856 4 0 $u http://libsw.nuk.edu.tw/login?url=http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3125846 $z http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3125846