國立高雄大學圖資館 |

登入

回首頁

Uneasy union :Marriage and the liberal state

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Uneasy union :
其他題名:	Marriage and the liberal state
作者:	Metz, Tamara.
面頁冊數:	244 p.
附註:	Advisers: Michael J. Sandel; Jane Mansbridge; J. Russell Muirhead.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-05, Section: A, page: 1944.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International65-05A.
標題:	Political Science, General.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3131932
ISBN:	0496791729

Uneasy union :Marriage and the liberal state
Metz, Tamara.

Uneasy union :Marriage and the liberal state [electronic resource] - 244 p.

Advisers: Michael J. Sandel; Jane Mansbridge; J. Russell Muirhead.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2004.

By focusing critical attention on aspects of the marriage dilemma that are often overlooked, this thesis presents insights essential to crafting a more compelling and consistent liberal model of marriage and the state than is currently available. In clarifying the unspoken assumptions and competing commitments implicit in contemporary debates and practice, this investigation contributes to a more nuanced and realistic, therefore more just and useful picture of that essential but always imperfect division between public and private life in a free polity. On a broader level, this thesis traces the unfolding logic of liberal political theory and practice.

ISBN: 0496791729Subjects--Topical Terms:

212408
Political Science, General.

Uneasy union :Marriage and the liberal state
LDR:03852nmm _2200313 _450 001 162669
005 20051017073510.5
008 230606s2004 eng d
020 $a 0496791729
035 $a 00149170
035 $a 162669
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 0 $a Metz, Tamara. $3 227813
245 1 0 $a Uneasy union : $b Marriage and the liberal state $h [electronic resource]
300 $a 244 p.
500 $a Advisers: Michael J. Sandel; Jane Mansbridge; J. Russell Muirhead.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-05, Section: A, page: 1944.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2004.
520 # $a By focusing critical attention on aspects of the marriage dilemma that are often overlooked, this thesis presents insights essential to crafting a more compelling and consistent liberal model of marriage and the state than is currently available. In clarifying the unspoken assumptions and competing commitments implicit in contemporary debates and practice, this investigation contributes to a more nuanced and realistic, therefore more just and useful picture of that essential but always imperfect division between public and private life in a free polity. On a broader level, this thesis traces the unfolding logic of liberal political theory and practice.
520 # $a Should the liberal state define and confer marital status? As a matter of practice, in the U.S., the state controls marriage to the degree that it is useful to think of marriage as "established" in this country. Yet despite the obvious political significance of this practice, few have defended it: most assume that the state properly serves as the primary public arbiter of conjugal status. Incoherence and noticeable silences in contemporary debates about marriage are only the most recent hints of the difficulties with this assumption.
520 # $a To understand these difficulties and to decide whether the liberal state ought to control marital status, I argue that we must inquire into the functions of public recognition and regulation of marital status. This inquiry highlights difficulties with each of the three prominent, though typically implicit, justifications of state control of marital status. The Religious account conflicts with the basic liberal commitment to the separation of church and state. The Instrumental account overemphasizes what I call the material side of marriage, though it squares easily with traditional liberal approaches to protecting diversity, stability and equality. Fully elaborated, the Constitutive account explains the unique expressive value often attributed to marital status. Yet it also highlights the problems with liberal state control of such a status. This investigation, therefore, leaves us in an apparent bind: If marriage requires constitutive recognition from an ethical authority, yet the liberal state is ill-suited to provide such recognition, must we choose between a healthy marital institution and our liberal commitments? Drawing on G. W. F. Hegel, John Locke and John Stuart Mill, I argue, no: disestablishing marriage would protect both. Disentangling "marriage" from state control would better serve marriage and other intimate caregiving arrangements in all their variety; it would protect freedom of expression and cultural pluralism; it would serve goals of gender equality and equal treatment of citizens before the law.
590 $a School code: 0084.
650 # 0 $a Political Science, General. $3 212408
690 $a 0615
710 0 # $a Harvard University. $3 212445
773 0 # $g 65-05A. $t Dissertation Abstracts International
790 $a 0084
790 1 0 $a Mansbridge, Jane, $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Muirhead, J. Russell, $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Sandel, Michael J., $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2004
856 4 0 $u http://libsw.nuk.edu.tw/login?url=http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3131932 $z http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3131932