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Legislative issue attention.

Stanford University.

Legislative issue attention.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Legislative issue attention.
Author:	Woon, Jonathan E.
Description:	118 p.
Notes:	Adviser: Keith Krehbiel.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-04, Section: A, page: 1487.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International66-04A.
Subject:	Political Science, General.
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3171699
ISBN:	9780542084522

Legislative issue attention.
Woon, Jonathan E.

Legislative issue attention. - 118 p.

Adviser: Keith Krehbiel.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2005.

The number of potential conflicts in the public realm is unlimited, yet political resources for resolving conflict are scarce. Legislative institutions play a central part in sorting out the relative importance of public concerns. A more comprehensive understanding of legislative politics therefore requires understanding how and why legislators choose which issues to pursue and how they pursue them. To gain a theoretical understanding, I develop and analyze a game theoretic model in which issue attention ultimately affects policy outcomes. In the model, legislators are policy-motivated, but decision-making is constrained by the scarcity of resources. The theoretical analysis identifies two important factors that affect issue attention: the severity of the status quo (how bad things are relative to how they could be) and individual legislators' agenda positions (procedural rights that affect what the legislature will consider). In the empirical analysis, I test predictions about how these factors affect the amount and the nature of individual legislators' attention to specific issues. First, through an analysis of bill sponsorship, I examine which factors affect the nature of attention. Using negative binomial regression, I find that committee membership and leadership are the most important factors shaping legislators' issue-specific attention. Committee factors consistently outweigh competing factors (constituency, ideology, party, and national conditions) across a variety of issues. Thus, I find strong support for the hypothesis that agenda positions affect attention but no support that the status quo does. Second, I test the proposal moderation hypothesis. Do legislators with higher agenda priority propose more moderate bills than legislators with lower priority? The analysis relies on the principle of revealed preference to first estimate bill locations with cosponsorship data. The hypothesis is then tested by estimating the relationship between bill locations and sponsors' positions. The findings support the hypothesis. Thus, when the theory and evidence are considered together, this dissertation shows that procedural rights and access to the agenda are the most important factors that shape legislators' attention to issues.

ISBN: 9780542084522Subjects--Topical Terms:

212408
Political Science, General.

Legislative issue attention.
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520 # $a The number of potential conflicts in the public realm is unlimited, yet political resources for resolving conflict are scarce. Legislative institutions play a central part in sorting out the relative importance of public concerns. A more comprehensive understanding of legislative politics therefore requires understanding how and why legislators choose which issues to pursue and how they pursue them. To gain a theoretical understanding, I develop and analyze a game theoretic model in which issue attention ultimately affects policy outcomes. In the model, legislators are policy-motivated, but decision-making is constrained by the scarcity of resources. The theoretical analysis identifies two important factors that affect issue attention: the severity of the status quo (how bad things are relative to how they could be) and individual legislators' agenda positions (procedural rights that affect what the legislature will consider). In the empirical analysis, I test predictions about how these factors affect the amount and the nature of individual legislators' attention to specific issues. First, through an analysis of bill sponsorship, I examine which factors affect the nature of attention. Using negative binomial regression, I find that committee membership and leadership are the most important factors shaping legislators' issue-specific attention. Committee factors consistently outweigh competing factors (constituency, ideology, party, and national conditions) across a variety of issues. Thus, I find strong support for the hypothesis that agenda positions affect attention but no support that the status quo does. Second, I test the proposal moderation hypothesis. Do legislators with higher agenda priority propose more moderate bills than legislators with lower priority? The analysis relies on the principle of revealed preference to first estimate bill locations with cosponsorship data. The hypothesis is then tested by estimating the relationship between bill locations and sponsors' positions. The findings support the hypothesis. Thus, when the theory and evidence are considered together, this dissertation shows that procedural rights and access to the agenda are the most important factors that shape legislators' attention to issues.
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