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Essays on institutions and fiscal po...

Harvard University.

Essays on institutions and fiscal policy in the American states.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on institutions and fiscal policy in the American states.
作者:	Rose, Shanna Suzanne.
面頁冊數:	94 p.
附註:	Advisers: James Alt; Kenneth Shepsle; Christopher Avery.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-05, Section: A, page: 1943.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International66-05A.
標題:	Political Science, General.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3174020
ISBN:	9780542115660

Essays on institutions and fiscal policy in the American states.
Rose, Shanna Suzanne.

Essays on institutions and fiscal policy in the American states. - 94 p.

Advisers: James Alt; Kenneth Shepsle; Christopher Avery.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2005.

This dissertation examines the effects of institutions---fiscal rules, term limits, and the separation of powers---on the political manipulation of government finances in the American states. The first essay tests the theory that balanced budget rules limit politicians' ability to manipulate the timing of spending and taxes for electoral gain. Using dynamic panel estimation, I show that while spending rises before and falls after elections in states that can carry deficits into the next fiscal year, this pattern does not exist in states with "no-carry" rules. However, I show that this effect depends critically on the ease with which politicians can circumvent no-carry rules by borrowing. The second essay reconsiders the conventional wisdom that binding gubernatorial term limits are associated with higher spending and taxes. I argue that previous studies are misspecified as a result of their failure to take into account widespread changes in term limit laws over the past fifty years. Using a difference-in-differences approach, I show that binding two-term limits are not, in fact, associated with larger government. One possible explanation for this finding is that governors care about their reputations even when they cannot stand for reelection; this is consistent with the fact that many term-limited governors go on to run for higher office. The third essay investigates the relationship between the executive-legislative balance of power and the level of public spending. I find that greater executive budget authority is associated with modestly lower per capita spending; however, this result is strongest under minority Republican governors, negligible under unified partisan control, and reversed under minority Democratic governors---suggesting that governors use their powers primarily for partisan purposes rather than to promote fiscal restraint.

ISBN: 9780542115660Subjects--Topical Terms:

212408
Political Science, General.

Essays on institutions and fiscal policy in the American states.
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