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Essays on the political economy of f...

Shelton, Cameron A.

Essays on the political economy of fiscal and monetary policy.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays on the political economy of fiscal and monetary policy.
Author:	Shelton, Cameron A.
Description:	133 p.
Notes:	Adviser: Romain Wacziarg.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-08, Section: A, page: 3023.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International66-08A.
Subject:	Political Science, General.
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3186399
ISBN:	9780542286926

Essays on the political economy of fiscal and monetary policy.
Shelton, Cameron A.

Essays on the political economy of fiscal and monetary policy. - 133 p.

Adviser: Romain Wacziarg.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2005.

I use government expenditure data on individual categories and various levels of government to test theories of government size. I estimate a complete specification so as to avoid omitted variables bias. Looking at a detailed pattern of correlations allows me to test implications of the theories beyond those effects they were hypothesized to explain and delivers interesting new results: a partial repudiation of Rodrik's theory of the role of openness, support for a version of Meltzer and Richard which is extended to include the extent of political rights, an explanation of the puzzling Wagner's Law, and more.

ISBN: 9780542286926Subjects--Topical Terms:

212408
Political Science, General.

Essays on the political economy of fiscal and monetary policy.
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245 1 0 $a Essays on the political economy of fiscal and monetary policy.
300 $a 133 p.
500 $a Adviser: Romain Wacziarg.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-08, Section: A, page: 3023.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2005.
520 # $a I use government expenditure data on individual categories and various levels of government to test theories of government size. I estimate a complete specification so as to avoid omitted variables bias. Looking at a detailed pattern of correlations allows me to test implications of the theories beyond those effects they were hypothesized to explain and delivers interesting new results: a partial repudiation of Rodrik's theory of the role of openness, support for a version of Meltzer and Richard which is extended to include the extent of political rights, an explanation of the puzzling Wagner's Law, and more.
520 # $a Previous tests of the rational partisan theory of political business cycles have remarkably little power to distinguish between it and predecessors based on naive expectations. Looking at the direct response of expectations to election surprise, I establish that the resolution of uncertainty over future aggregate demand policy that takes place on Election Day can result in large movements in the forecasts of large corporations. I discover a great deal of country-level heterogeneity. I show that some political systems are more susceptible to politically induced economic volatility than others and corporatist economies, where firms tend to coordinate activities via non-market mechanisms, tend to be less responsive to changes in aggregate demand policy than market economies.
520 # $a Redistributive fiscal policy is used both to promote social goals and to buy the votes of various electoral demographics. But the relative magnitudes of these activities is unknown because separately identifying these effects is difficult. Using Bartels' concept of voting power, I test Dixit and Londregan's model of vote-buying with ideologically motivated parties. The vast majority of a household's net redistribution is explained by its income rather than its voting power. Vote-buying is likely minimized because candidates cannot commit to redistributive policy, thus voters view campaign promises as cheap talk.
520 # $a These three chapters represent distinct contributions to the political economy of fiscal and monetary policy. In each case, the contribution is a novel reduced-form test with the power to distinguish between competing theories where such distinction has, in the past, been difficult, delivering a variety of interesting empirical results.
590 $a School code: 0212.
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791 $a Ph.D.
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