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Manipulating electoral rules: Intra-...

McElwain, Kenneth Mori.

Manipulating electoral rules: Intra-party conflict, partisan interests, and constitutional thickness.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Manipulating electoral rules: Intra-party conflict, partisan interests, and constitutional thickness.
作者:	McElwain, Kenneth Mori.
面頁冊數:	248 p.
附註:	Adviser: Daniel Okimoto.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-08, Section: A, page: 3079.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International66-08A.
標題:	Political Science, General.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3187322
ISBN:	9780542295720

Manipulating electoral rules: Intra-party conflict, partisan interests, and constitutional thickness.
McElwain, Kenneth Mori.

Manipulating electoral rules: Intra-party conflict, partisan interests, and constitutional thickness. - 248 p.

Adviser: Daniel Okimoto.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2005.

Although existing theories posit that political parties have strong incentives to manipulate electoral rules, empirical work indicates that such changes are relatively infrequent. Particularly puzzling are cases where political parties do not change electoral rules even when they are expected to benefit and have the necessary parliamentary votes. This dissertation resolves this disconnect in the literature by developing a framework to predict when and how parties alter different features of the electoral system. First, I argue that institutional changes are rare because two additional constraints not identified in extant studies---conflicts within parties and constitutional restrictions---play a critical inhibiting role. Second, I show that different features of the electoral system trigger these constraints in different ways, and that political parties strategically manipulate those regulations that face the fewest obstacles.

ISBN: 9780542295720Subjects--Topical Terms:

212408
Political Science, General.

Manipulating electoral rules: Intra-party conflict, partisan interests, and constitutional thickness.
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520 # $a Although existing theories posit that political parties have strong incentives to manipulate electoral rules, empirical work indicates that such changes are relatively infrequent. Particularly puzzling are cases where political parties do not change electoral rules even when they are expected to benefit and have the necessary parliamentary votes. This dissertation resolves this disconnect in the literature by developing a framework to predict when and how parties alter different features of the electoral system. First, I argue that institutional changes are rare because two additional constraints not identified in extant studies---conflicts within parties and constitutional restrictions---play a critical inhibiting role. Second, I show that different features of the electoral system trigger these constraints in different ways, and that political parties strategically manipulate those regulations that face the fewest obstacles.
520 # $a Even when political parties are prevented from making significant changes to the electoral system, however, they can still manipulate micro-level electoral rules---which govern campaign regulations and political financing---with remarkable frequency. Because these rules create fewer intra-party distributional asymmetries and are rarely encoded in the constitution, they are easier to change. In Japan, the LDP restricted the range of campaign tactics allowed to bias election results in favor of incumbent candidates, thus helping the LDP defend the seats they already controlled. In Ireland, political parties fought over the design of electoral districts and whether to impose limits on campaign expenditures, neither of which the constitution specifies. In both Japan and Ireland, the timing and content of micro-level changes directly reflected the partisan motives of the parties-in-power.
520 # $a I examine the importance of intra-party and constitutional restrictions through case studies of Japan and Ireland. In Japan, the LDP'S leaders could not force a party-line vote on initiatives that created large, internal distributional asymmetries, because they had little coercive power over the party's rank-and-file. In Ireland, the primary hurdle was the national constitution, which strictly specified the electoral formula and thus required a referendum vote for successful institutional change. A cross-national statistical test confirms that the timing of major electoral rule changes depends substantially on conflicts within parties, bargaining in parliament between parties, and the level of constitutional specificity.
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