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Governing global markets: Private de...

Copelovitch, Mark Steven.

Governing global markets: Private debt and the politics of International Monetary Fund lending.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Governing global markets: Private debt and the politics of International Monetary Fund lending.
作者:	Copelovitch, Mark Steven.
面頁冊數:	289 p.
附註:	Adviser: Jeffry A. Frieden.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-11, Section: A, page: 4174.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International66-11A.
標題:	Political Science, International Law and Relations.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3194393
ISBN:	9780542391453

Governing global markets: Private debt and the politics of International Monetary Fund lending.
Copelovitch, Mark Steven.

Governing global markets: Private debt and the politics of International Monetary Fund lending. - 289 p.

Adviser: Jeffry A. Frieden.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2005.

Using both statistical and case study analyses, I find clear support for my argument. Differences in the amount and concentration of the G-5 countries' commercial bank exposure, along with changes in the instruments and maturity of a borrower country's private external debt, have significant and substantive effects on the size and terms of short-term IMF loans. In addition to explaining an important empirical puzzle, this dissertation sheds light on broader issues in international political economy. Although IMF lending represents only a single case of IO policymaking, the results of this project suggest the need to move beyond one-dimensional theories of international institutions that privilege a single actor or variable in favor of a more complex and dynamic understanding of global governance. My findings also shed light on the relative merits of recent proposals to reform the "international financial architecture."

ISBN: 9780542391453Subjects--Topical Terms:

212542
Political Science, International Law and Relations.

Governing global markets: Private debt and the politics of International Monetary Fund lending.
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245 1 0 $a Governing global markets: Private debt and the politics of International Monetary Fund lending.
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500 $a Adviser: Jeffry A. Frieden.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-11, Section: A, page: 4174.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2005.
520 # $a Using both statistical and case study analyses, I find clear support for my argument. Differences in the amount and concentration of the G-5 countries' commercial bank exposure, along with changes in the instruments and maturity of a borrower country's private external debt, have significant and substantive effects on the size and terms of short-term IMF loans. In addition to explaining an important empirical puzzle, this dissertation sheds light on broader issues in international political economy. Although IMF lending represents only a single case of IO policymaking, the results of this project suggest the need to move beyond one-dimensional theories of international institutions that privilege a single actor or variable in favor of a more complex and dynamic understanding of global governance. My findings also shed light on the relative merits of recent proposals to reform the "international financial architecture."
520 # $a What explains this variation in IMF policies? More broadly, how do international organizations (IOs) make decisions and set policies at the global level? To address these empirical and theoretical questions, I develop a principal-agent framework in which IMF policies are jointly determined by two key actors: the Fund's five largest shareholders, the G-5 countries, which exercise de facto control over the IMF Executive Board (EB) and utilize IMF loans to protect their domestic financial interests; and the IMF staff, whose expectations about market actors' responses to Fund policies influence the size and terms of the lending arrangements they propose to the EB for approval. Using this framework, I argue that these actors' preferences over the size and terms of IMF programs depend on the composition of international capital flows to developing countries. As both domestic interests within the G-5 countries and independent actors in world markets, private creditors shape the views of the Fund staff and G-5 governments over the core tradeoff between liquidity and moral hazard confronting the IMF as it decides how much and on what terms to lend. As a result, IMF policies vary over time and across cases in accordance with changes in the amount, instruments, and maturity of IMF borrowers' private external debt.
520 # $1 0 million to over $3 0 billion. Many of these loans far exceeded the amount the borrower countries were eligible to receive under the Fund's quota system, while others were significantly smaller than the borrower's allotted quota. Similarly, the policy reforms ("conditionality") mandated by the IMF in exchange for its loans also varied widely: in some cases, IMF lending arrangements included a large number of conditions, while in others the Fund provided financing with few strings attached. $4 00 billion in short-term loans to developing countries, ranging in size from less than $a This dissertation seeks to explain the lending behavior of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) over the last two decades. During this period, the IMF provided over
590 $a School code: 0084.
650 # 0 $a Political Science, International Law and Relations. $3 212542
650 # 0 $a Political Science, General. $3 212408
650 # 0 $a Economics, Finance. $3 212585
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