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Essays on local matching.

Makler, Christopher Rarig.

Essays on local matching.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays on local matching.
Author:	Makler, Christopher Rarig.
Description:	67 p.
Notes:	Adviser: Ken Burdett.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-12, Section: A, page: 4480.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International66-12A.
Subject:	Economics, Labor.
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3197708
ISBN:	9780542435317

Essays on local matching.
Makler, Christopher Rarig.

Essays on local matching. - 67 p.

Adviser: Ken Burdett.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2005.

The standard two-sided matching model with search frictions is extended to allow for geographic dispersion. The encounter technology is biased towards local meetings, so that agents are more likely to meet other agents who are closer to themselves than those who are far away. Steady state equilibria exist and result in otherwise identical agents receiving different equilibrium payoffs. This inequality occurs because offer distributions are specific to location, making agents' reservation strategies depend not only on their own type but also on the location from which they are searching. Applications to the labor and marriage markets are explored.

ISBN: 9780542435317Subjects--Topical Terms:

212660
Economics, Labor.

Essays on local matching.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-12, Section: A, page: 4480.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2005.
520 # $a The standard two-sided matching model with search frictions is extended to allow for geographic dispersion. The encounter technology is biased towards local meetings, so that agents are more likely to meet other agents who are closer to themselves than those who are far away. Steady state equilibria exist and result in otherwise identical agents receiving different equilibrium payoffs. This inequality occurs because offer distributions are specific to location, making agents' reservation strategies depend not only on their own type but also on the location from which they are searching. Applications to the labor and marriage markets are explored.
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