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Three essays on agents' incentives a...

University of Michigan.

Three essays on agents' incentives and behavioral characteristics.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Three essays on agents' incentives and behavioral characteristics.
Author:	Yeo, Eun Jung.
Description:	93 p.
Notes:	Adviser: Illoong Kwon.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-07, Section: A, page: 2678.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-07A.
Subject:	Economics, General.
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3224790
ISBN:	9780542791383

Three essays on agents' incentives and behavioral characteristics.
Yeo, Eun Jung.

Three essays on agents' incentives and behavioral characteristics. - 93 p.

Adviser: Illoong Kwon.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2006.

Chapter 2 examines the relationship between an agent's decision to increase productivity and the decision to overstate performance. When the market rationally expects the agent's overstatement, we show that: (i) the relative size of overstatement decreases in true performance; (ii) higher cost of falsification increases the agent's incentive for production effort even when the costs of two efforts are independent; and (iii) the principal cannot achieve the first-best outcome even when the agent is risk-neutral and the market expectation is correct.

ISBN: 9780542791383Subjects--Topical Terms:

212429
Economics, General.

Three essays on agents' incentives and behavioral characteristics.
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100 0 $a Yeo, Eun Jung. $3 264179
245 1 0 $a Three essays on agents' incentives and behavioral characteristics.
300 $a 93 p.
500 $a Adviser: Illoong Kwon.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-07, Section: A, page: 2678.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2006.
520 # $a Chapter 2 examines the relationship between an agent's decision to increase productivity and the decision to overstate performance. When the market rationally expects the agent's overstatement, we show that: (i) the relative size of overstatement decreases in true performance; (ii) higher cost of falsification increases the agent's incentive for production effort even when the costs of two efforts are independent; and (iii) the principal cannot achieve the first-best outcome even when the agent is risk-neutral and the market expectation is correct.
520 # $a Chapter 3 explores the relation between CEO pay-performance ratios and the stock return sensitivities in response to firms' earnings announcements. I test theoretical predictions using Dow Jones Industrial data over the period from 1994 to 2001. Through examining a new measure, stock return sensitivities, in response to firm's earning announcements, I find that stock returns are more sensitive to the higher CEO pay-performance ratio regardless of earnings categories. This implies that CEOs whose pay-performance ratios are high are more (less) likely to be involved in falsification when the firm's performance is bad (good). This supports theoretical predictions derived from the study of comparative statics. Moreover, CEOs who have been in the position for a shorter tenure have a higher (lower) incentive to manipulate earnings when their firms' performance is bad (good).
520 # $a This dissertation considers three topics regarding agents' incentives and behavioral characteristics. Chapter 1 investigates agents' overconfidence in forecasting by analyzing their learning behavior both theoretically and empirically. In models with repeated forecasts, agents' learning patterns reveal information regarding their overconfidence and abilities. Based on theoretical predictions, I develop empirical methods to test whether previous forecasting accuracy leads agents to become overconfident. Using detailed data on financial analysts' forecasts, I find that (i) analysts' past accuracy does not necessarily lead them to be overconfident; (ii) analysts with larger past deviations from the consensus forecasts do not exhibit more overconfidence; and (iii) overall, analysts do not exhibit overconfidence. Therefore, contrary to the results from previous studies, in practice, overconfidence does not significantly affect the decisions of financial analysts.
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650 # 0 $a Economics, Finance. $3 212585
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