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Reputation phenomena in continuous-t...

Faingold, Eduardo.

Reputation phenomena in continuous-time games.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Reputation phenomena in continuous-time games.
Author:	Faingold, Eduardo.
Description:	102 p.
Notes:	Adviser: George J. Mailath.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-07, Section: A, page: 2692.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-07A.
Subject:	Economics, Theory.
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3225453
ISBN:	9780542798887

Reputation phenomena in continuous-time games.
Faingold, Eduardo.

Reputation phenomena in continuous-time games. - 102 p.

Adviser: George J. Mailath.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2006.

A common interpretation of patience in discounted games is that the interaction takes place in continuous time and the length of the period is short, i.e., players are capable of adjusting their actions frequently. However, in imperfect monitoring games, as the period length shrinks to zero, the number of signals observed in any given interval of real time increases without bound. If signals are statistically informative, then, as the period length tends to zero, the degree of monitoring imperfection becomes asymptotically negligible. The comparative statics, thus, is in tension with the very spirit of the theory of repeated games with imperfect monitoring.

ISBN: 9780542798887Subjects--Topical Terms:

212740
Economics, Theory.

Reputation phenomena in continuous-time games.
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100 0 $a Faingold, Eduardo. $3 264186
245 1 0 $a Reputation phenomena in continuous-time games.
300 $a 102 p.
500 $a Adviser: George J. Mailath.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-07, Section: A, page: 2692.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2006.
520 # $a A common interpretation of patience in discounted games is that the interaction takes place in continuous time and the length of the period is short, i.e., players are capable of adjusting their actions frequently. However, in imperfect monitoring games, as the period length shrinks to zero, the number of signals observed in any given interval of real time increases without bound. If signals are statistically informative, then, as the period length tends to zero, the degree of monitoring imperfection becomes asymptotically negligible. The comparative statics, thus, is in tension with the very spirit of the theory of repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
520 # $a In Chapter 1, I study reputation phenomena in games with frequent decisions and persistently imperfect monitoring. In these games, as the period length tends to zero, the monitoring structure approaches a continuous-time limit, and, further, the limit monitoring is non-trivially imperfect (i.e. has full support). Unlike standard imperfect monitoring games, repeated games with persistently imperfect monitoring allow a meaningful comparative statics with the period length, accommodating the continuous-time interpretation of discounting with the requirement that the overall informativeness of the monitoring be bounded. I consider games with persistently imperfect monitoring in which a long-run player faces a sequence of short-run players. The long-run player can be one of many types and the short-run players are uncertain as to which type of long-run player they face.
520 # $a In contrast to Chapter 1, where the focus is on payoff bounds for patient players, in Chapter 2 (joint work with Yuliy Sannikov) the interest is in a characterization of equilibrium behavior for a fixed discount rate. We study a continuous-time dynamic game between a large player and a population of small anonymous players in which the actions of the large player are imperfectly observable. We explore two versions of the game. In the complete information game, in which it is common knowledge that the large player is a strategic normal type, we show that intertemporal incentives collapse. In the incomplete information game, the small players assign positive probability to the large player being either a commitment type, who plays the same action at all times, irrespective of the past history of play, or a normal type (with payoffs from the complete information game). (Abstract shortened by UMI.)
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773 0 # $g 67-07A. $t Dissertation Abstracts International
790 $a 0175
790 1 0 $a Mailath, George J., $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2006
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