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Essays in political economy.

Iorio, Daniela.

Essays in political economy.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in political economy.
作者:	Iorio, Daniela.
面頁冊數:	53 p.
附註:	Adviser: Antonio Merlo.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-07, Section: A, page: 2674.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-07A.
標題:	Economics, General.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3225476
ISBN:	9780542799112

Essays in political economy.
Iorio, Daniela.

Essays in political economy. - 53 p.

Adviser: Antonio Merlo.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2006.

This dissertation examines whether coalition parties strategically react to electoral polls and how this affects the stability of a government coalition. The dissertation is articulated into two chapters. The first chapter analyzes a game where parties are infinitely lived and can stay in office for a given number of periods. Following an election, a coalition government is formed. In any period prior to the end of the legislature, parties receive information regarding their expected electoral gains or losses through opinion polls. This may lead coalition parties to negotiate over whether to preserve the current government or not. If the ruling coalition still enjoys the support of the parliamentary majority, it stays in office. If not, general elections are held at the end of the period. The model explores how the equilibrium outcomes, such as the formed coalition and its stability, depend on polls, the coalition type, the distribution of seats, the identity of the prime minister and the number of periods left. The second chapter investigates whether parties' reaction to electoral uncertainty plays any role in explaining cabinet reshuffles and termination in Western Europe. To this end, the model is structurally estimated using data about eleven parliamentary democracies with a proportional electoral system over the period 1970--2002. Estimation results confirm that the model can fit well the salient features of the data. Using the estimated model I conduct counterfactual experiments aimed to evaluate the impact on government survival probabilities of polls informativeness, and alternative institutional environments. As for the former experiment, main findings are that when polls become perfectly informative the stability of coalition governments increases, but the coalition types do not change. As for the latter experiments, I (i) change the length of the inter-election period, (ii) impose that elections cannot be held before a year has passed since the previous election, (iii) impose that the party with the largest seat share is selected to be the formateur. The results of the experiments suggest that the institutional environment plays an important role in determining both the equilibrium decisions of forming and preserving a government.

ISBN: 9780542799112Subjects--Topical Terms:

212429
Economics, General.

Essays in political economy.
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520 # $a This dissertation examines whether coalition parties strategically react to electoral polls and how this affects the stability of a government coalition. The dissertation is articulated into two chapters. The first chapter analyzes a game where parties are infinitely lived and can stay in office for a given number of periods. Following an election, a coalition government is formed. In any period prior to the end of the legislature, parties receive information regarding their expected electoral gains or losses through opinion polls. This may lead coalition parties to negotiate over whether to preserve the current government or not. If the ruling coalition still enjoys the support of the parliamentary majority, it stays in office. If not, general elections are held at the end of the period. The model explores how the equilibrium outcomes, such as the formed coalition and its stability, depend on polls, the coalition type, the distribution of seats, the identity of the prime minister and the number of periods left. The second chapter investigates whether parties' reaction to electoral uncertainty plays any role in explaining cabinet reshuffles and termination in Western Europe. To this end, the model is structurally estimated using data about eleven parliamentary democracies with a proportional electoral system over the period 1970--2002. Estimation results confirm that the model can fit well the salient features of the data. Using the estimated model I conduct counterfactual experiments aimed to evaluate the impact on government survival probabilities of polls informativeness, and alternative institutional environments. As for the former experiment, main findings are that when polls become perfectly informative the stability of coalition governments increases, but the coalition types do not change. As for the latter experiments, I (i) change the length of the inter-election period, (ii) impose that elections cannot be held before a year has passed since the previous election, (iii) impose that the party with the largest seat share is selected to be the formateur. The results of the experiments suggest that the institutional environment plays an important role in determining both the equilibrium decisions of forming and preserving a government.
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