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Empirical research in political economy.

Falk, Justin Robert.

Empirical research in political economy.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Empirical research in political economy.
作者:	Falk, Justin Robert.
面頁冊數:	107 p.
附註:	Adviser: Ken Chay.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-02, Section: A, page: 0653.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International68-02A.
標題:	Economics, General.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3253855

Empirical research in political economy.
Falk, Justin Robert.

Empirical research in political economy. - 107 p.

Adviser: Ken Chay.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2006.

Although economists have made significant progress in developing theories to describe the political processes underlying economic policy, reliable empirical studies of these processes are sparse. In my research, I apply innovative techniques in data analysis to provide insight into two questions of political economy: (1) how much funding do members of the House of Representatives misallocate for the benefit of their own constituents, and (2) how does the disclosure of corruption affect the electoral outcomes of representatives. These empirical approaches lead to credible inference on causal relationships, while most existing studies only estimate correlations.Subjects--Topical Terms:

212429
Economics, General.

Empirical research in political economy.
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245 1 0 $a Empirical research in political economy.
300 $a 107 p.
500 $a Adviser: Ken Chay.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-02, Section: A, page: 0653.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2006.
520 # $a Although economists have made significant progress in developing theories to describe the political processes underlying economic policy, reliable empirical studies of these processes are sparse. In my research, I apply innovative techniques in data analysis to provide insight into two questions of political economy: (1) how much funding do members of the House of Representatives misallocate for the benefit of their own constituents, and (2) how does the disclosure of corruption affect the electoral outcomes of representatives. These empirical approaches lead to credible inference on causal relationships, while most existing studies only estimate correlations.
520 # $a In the first chapter, I estimate the extent to which the bargaining power of a representative as measured by her tenure in office and the population of her district determines the amount of federal funding allocated to the representatives district. In order to control for the other determinants of funding, such as cross-district variations in the value of federal funding, I use a regression discontinuity design based on the congressional reapportionments. This procedure leads to large estimates for the coefficients on the bargaining power variables, which indicates significant patronage.
520 # $a In the second chapter, I estimate the effects of disclosure of corruption on an incumbents electoral outcomes. Inference of these effects has been obscured by the potential incomparability of corrupt and incorrupt politicians and the inherent discretion in which incumbents are disclosed as corrupt, run for reelection, and face challengers. I address these complications by developing a comprehensive model and applying this model to data from a particularly illuminating audit of corruption in the House. In this episode of corruption, disclosure was not selective, and both electoral outcomes and corruption status are observed for an election in which the electorate was aware of the incumbents corruption status and an election in which the electorate was not aware. My primary finding is that if all incumbents had run for reelection, then the average vote-share of incumbents disclosed as corrupt would have been approximately five percentage-points less than the vote-shares of incumbent whose corruption was suppressed.
590 $a School code: 0028.
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