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Competition as stimulus and obstacle...

Stanford University.

Competition as stimulus and obstacle to economic cooperation and positive ties.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Competition as stimulus and obstacle to economic cooperation and positive ties.
作者:	Trapido, Denis.
面頁冊數:	191 p.
附註:	Adviser: Mark Granovetter.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-05, Section: A, page: 2003.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International69-05A.
標題:	Sociology, Industrial and Labor Relations.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3313674
ISBN:	9780549622581

Competition as stimulus and obstacle to economic cooperation and positive ties.
Trapido, Denis.

Competition as stimulus and obstacle to economic cooperation and positive ties. - 191 p.

Adviser: Mark Granovetter.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2008.

The dissertation makes two additional contributions to economic sociology. First, it establishes a dialogue between different sociological conceptions of economic competition and the measures that these conceptions imply. It critiques the existing relational measures of competition and advocates measures that do not impose resource valuations but instead rely on valuations reported by the actors. The empirical analysis finds merit in the latter type of measures. Second, it develops a theory of competitive embeddedness. The theory enriches the embeddedness research program by arguing that embedded outcomes do not necessarily result from purely positive interaction and may also arise from competitive relations.

ISBN: 9780549622581Subjects--Topical Terms:

212661
Sociology, Industrial and Labor Relations.

Competition as stimulus and obstacle to economic cooperation and positive ties.
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245 1 0 $a Competition as stimulus and obstacle to economic cooperation and positive ties.
300 $a 191 p.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-05, Section: A, page: 2003.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2008.
520 $a The dissertation makes two additional contributions to economic sociology. First, it establishes a dialogue between different sociological conceptions of economic competition and the measures that these conceptions imply. It critiques the existing relational measures of competition and advocates measures that do not impose resource valuations but instead rely on valuations reported by the actors. The empirical analysis finds merit in the latter type of measures. Second, it develops a theory of competitive embeddedness. The theory enriches the embeddedness research program by arguing that embedded outcomes do not necessarily result from purely positive interaction and may also arise from competitive relations.
520 $a The quantitative empirical analyses use data from three settings: the venture capital industry in the United States in 1990-2002; the merchant ventures in Bristol, England in 1689-1815; and the San Francisco Bay Area drug development industry from the 1990s through 2005. I compiled the former two datasets using various public and proprietary sources. The latter dataset is based on 90 structured interviews that I conducted in 2006 and 2007. The dataset covers nearly two thirds of the active drug development companies in the region.
520 $a Why does competition isolate and alienate some economic actors but reinforce cooperation and positive ties between others? My analysis suggests that social connectedness among competitors is not susceptible to impersonal exogenous influences such as regional culture and military or economic crisis. Instead, it can be facilitated or impeded in micro-level personal interaction. I find that positive ties between competitors depend on the extent to which competitors communicate signals of collegiality and rivalry to each other. Signals of collegiality (orientation toward horizontal peer interaction)---but not signals of rivalry (orientation toward surpassing the other party on some vertical social dimension, such as wealth, power, and status)---facilitate positive acquaintance ties between competitors. Furthermore, my analysis of political competition demonstrates that economic cooperation is more likely between competitors of unequal professional involvement and experience. I argue that professionalism is a basis of social status, and higher-status partners initiate transactions with lower-status political competitors because individual status inequality enables the former to assert the status of their political groups.
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