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Signaling, beliefs, and prosocial be...

Grossman, Zachary Jacob.

Signaling, beliefs, and prosocial behavior.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Signaling, beliefs, and prosocial behavior.
作者:	Grossman, Zachary Jacob.
面頁冊數:	84 p.
附註:	Adviser: Matthew Rabin.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-09, Section: A, page: 3648.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International69-09A.
標題:	Economics, General.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3331619
ISBN:	9780549836872

Signaling, beliefs, and prosocial behavior.
Grossman, Zachary Jacob.

Signaling, beliefs, and prosocial behavior. - 84 p.

Adviser: Matthew Rabin.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2008.

Giving is a major economic activity but little understood. Preferences defined over resource allocations alone cannot explain the sensitivity of giving to informational conditions such as the visibility of a decision or awareness that it is being made. Social image, self-image, or beliefs-based altruism---which is a concern for how one's actions impact the feelings of another person regardless of the impact on that person's physical well-being each may explain part of this sensitivity, but these motivations have not been adequately distinguished conceptually nor empirically. I present a model of a dictator with preferences over the allocation of resources, but also over an observer's beliefs about these preferences, which, under three different interpretations, can correspond to each of these motivations. I experimentally test the model's predictions, finding evidence in support of social signaling, but not self-signaling nor beliefs-based altruism. Finally, while concern for image is arguably the best explanation for previous experimental results, these explanations rely upon the non-standard assumption that the structure of the decision is not common knowledge. I present a more general model of an image-motivated decision-maker whose behavior influences the observer's awareness of the elements of her choice set. I show that this model can explain the observed behavior and discuss behavioral and welfare consequences of imperfect awareness.

ISBN: 9780549836872Subjects--Topical Terms:

212429
Economics, General.

Signaling, beliefs, and prosocial behavior.
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520 $a Giving is a major economic activity but little understood. Preferences defined over resource allocations alone cannot explain the sensitivity of giving to informational conditions such as the visibility of a decision or awareness that it is being made. Social image, self-image, or beliefs-based altruism---which is a concern for how one's actions impact the feelings of another person regardless of the impact on that person's physical well-being each may explain part of this sensitivity, but these motivations have not been adequately distinguished conceptually nor empirically. I present a model of a dictator with preferences over the allocation of resources, but also over an observer's beliefs about these preferences, which, under three different interpretations, can correspond to each of these motivations. I experimentally test the model's predictions, finding evidence in support of social signaling, but not self-signaling nor beliefs-based altruism. Finally, while concern for image is arguably the best explanation for previous experimental results, these explanations rely upon the non-standard assumption that the structure of the decision is not common knowledge. I present a more general model of an image-motivated decision-maker whose behavior influences the observer's awareness of the elements of her choice set. I show that this model can explain the observed behavior and discuss behavioral and welfare consequences of imperfect awareness.
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