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董監事股權質押與公司治理之研究 = Share Collateraliz...

國立高雄大學金融管理學系碩士班

董監事股權質押與公司治理之研究 = Share Collateralization by Directors and Corporate Governance

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : 單行本
並列題名:	Share Collateralization by Directors and Corporate Governance
作者:	陳烷鈺,
其他團體作者:	國立高雄大學
出版地:	[高雄市]
出版者:	撰者;
出版年:	2009[民98]
面頁冊數:	69面圖，表 : 30公分;
標題:	信用風險
標題:	corporate governance
電子資源:	http://handle.ncl.edu.tw/11296/ndltd/51466053626020191077
附註:	參考書目：面56-62
附註:	指導教授：高蘭芬、陳怡凱
摘要註:	本研究探討重點主要在於董監持股質押為何會降低公司績效，其次探討對於高質押的公司而言，董監事名目持股與扣除質押後實際持股對績效的影響。最後檢測公司治理機制的良窳是否可以有效降低董監事股權質押對公司績效所造成的傷害。實證結果發現：(1)董監事股權質押比率提高，與公司盈餘股份偏離程度沒有顯著相關，但董監質押比率越高的公司，其盈餘席次偏離程度越大。(2)董監質押比率越高的公司，其信用風險也越高，且監察人內部化(受控制股東所控制)也越嚴重。(3)董監事名目持股在扣除質押股數後的實際持股比率與公司績效有正相關。(4)董監事股權質押會使公司的績效下降，即使公司有良好的公司治理機制，仍無法降低董監事股權質押所造成的傷害。然而當董事長與經理人分治時，會降低董監股權質押與公司績效的連結性。 The objective of this study is to investigate how the directors’ share collateralization damages the performance of the firm. To the firms with high pledgeratio, the effects of directors’ nominal share holdings and actual share holdings(normal shareholding deducts the pledge shares) on firm performances are also examined. Finally, we investigate whether the sound corporate governance mechanisms can reduce the damage by the directors’ share collateralization.Our empirical results show that there is no significant relationship between pledge ratio and the deviation between cash flow rights and share controlling rights. However, pledge ratio is positively related to the deviation between cash flow rightsand board controlling rights. Moreover, the higher the pledge ratio, the higher the firm’s credit risk and internalization of the supervisors (are controlled by controlling shareholders). The actual share holdings of the directors have the positive influence on firm performance. The directors’ share collateralization lowers firm performance, and the sound corporate governance mechanisms might not effectively reduce the damage by the directors’ share collateralization. When the CEO doesn’t serve as the chairman, the negative relationship between pledge ratio and firm performanceswould decrease.

董監事股權質押與公司治理之研究 = Share Collateralization by Directors and Corporate Governance
陳, 烷鈺

董監事股權質押與公司治理之研究 = Share Collateralization by Directors and Corporate Governance / 陳烷鈺撰 - [高雄市] : 撰者, 2009[民98]. - 69面 ; 圖，表 ; 30公分.
參考書目：面56-62指導教授：高蘭芬、陳怡凱.
信用風險corporate governance

董監事股權質押與公司治理之研究 = Share Collateralization by Directors and Corporate Governance
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