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'A mere party machine'? Judicial aut...

Engel, Stephen M.

'A mere party machine'? Judicial authority, party development, and the changing politics of attacking the courts.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	'A mere party machine'? Judicial authority, party development, and the changing politics of attacking the courts.
作者:	Engel, Stephen M.
面頁冊數:	503 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-06, Section: A, page: 2213.
附註:	Adviser: Stephen Skowronek.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International70-06A.
標題:	History, United States.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3361910
ISBN:	9781109206401

'A mere party machine'? Judicial authority, party development, and the changing politics of attacking the courts.
Engel, Stephen M.

'A mere party machine'? Judicial authority, party development, and the changing politics of attacking the courts. - 503 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-06, Section: A, page: 2213.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2009.

Politicians have questioned the legitimacy of independent judicial authority throughout American history, but the federal judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, appears to have become more secure over time. What explains the recurrence of hostilities and yet that judicial power appears, by many accounts, to remain secure?

ISBN: 9781109206401Subjects--Topical Terms:

212533
History, United States.

'A mere party machine'? Judicial authority, party development, and the changing politics of attacking the courts.
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245 1 0 $a 'A mere party machine'? Judicial authority, party development, and the changing politics of attacking the courts.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-06, Section: A, page: 2213.
500 $a Adviser: Stephen Skowronek.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2009.
520 $a Politicians have questioned the legitimacy of independent judicial authority throughout American history, but the federal judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, appears to have become more secure over time. What explains the recurrence of hostilities and yet that judicial power appears, by many accounts, to remain secure?
520 $a Many examinations of these hostilities suggest that they have had minimal impact since Reconstruction. Three arguments are put forth to explain this pattern. First, the Court is a majoritarian institution; its rulings fall out of line with majority interests only briefly. Second, the countermajoritarian threat is dismissed because strong judicial power serves politicians' interests. Third, a pervasive norm of deference to judicial authority or judicial supremacy developed after successful instances of court-curbing. Each account constructs these attacks as a recurring theme, as the manifestation of an engrained constitutional problem, which has diminishing effect due to politicians' recognition of strategic interests or the development of norms.
520 $a I reconsider these hostilities and identify variation in the tactics politicians pursue to manipulate judicial power. To explain change over time, I point not to the acceptance of judicial supremacy but to the gradual acceptance of dissenting views of the Constitution. Shifting perspectives on the threat posed by opposition---evident in politicians' views about political parties---influence how manipulations of judicial authority take shape. As politicians' perceptions toward opposition changed, their approach toward the judiciary---where opposition could become entrenched given lifetime appointment---changed in tandem. Once opposition was no longer viewed as a fundamental threat to the Constitution's survival and multiple interpretations considered legitimate, judicial power could henceforth be construed less as the seat of an illegitimate minority and more as an instrument to achieve political ends.
520 $a By recasting the history of anti-judicial hostilities around the development of loyal opposition, I identify what is new and different in successive episodes of conflict. Case studies utilize a range of qualitative materials: letters, speeches, manuscripts, executive branch memoranda, and congressional debates. In each, I show how politicians viewed the threat posed by opposition. I evaluate actions they took toward the judiciary and illustrate how shifts in ideas about opposition explain variation in inter-branch relations. By drawing attention to how leaders confronted the challenge of independent judicial authority in a democratic republic with different solutions---both political and judicial---and how each solution was taken up by subsequent generations in unexpected ways, I illustrate a developmental transformation where other scholars have seen only a structural dilemma.
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