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Structural estimation of a moral haz...

Jiang, Renna.

Structural estimation of a moral hazard model: An application to business selling.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Structural estimation of a moral hazard model: An application to business selling.
作者:	Jiang, Renna.
面頁冊數:	50 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-06, Section: A, page: 2147.
附註:	Advisers: Pradeep K. Chintagunta; Peter E. Rossi.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International70-06A.
標題:	Business Administration, Marketing.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3362035
ISBN:	9781109208931

Structural estimation of a moral hazard model: An application to business selling.
Jiang, Renna.

Structural estimation of a moral hazard model: An application to business selling. - 50 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-06, Section: A, page: 2147.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2009.

We propose and estimate a moral hazard model for contacts in business selling context, where manufacturers of industrial materials hire outside independent sales organizations as their representatives ("rep firms") to sell products to business customers. In return, rep firms receive commissions on realized sales. The question we address in this research is whether the observed commission rates are set at the optimal level, and if not, what are the economic consequences. This is different from most previous empirical contracting work which tests comparative statics predictions derived from theoretical models that impose optimality on manufacturers. A unique feature of the data is that we have a measure of salespeople's effort obtained from surveys. The effort data allow us to build a realistic model where salespeople have better information than the manufacturer about the opportunities in the field. Our empirical results show that optimal commission rates are twice as high as what are observed in the data, and that manufacturers could achieve greater profits by adopting the proposed rates.

ISBN: 9781109208931Subjects--Topical Terms:

212494
Business Administration, Marketing.

Structural estimation of a moral hazard model: An application to business selling.
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520 $a We propose and estimate a moral hazard model for contacts in business selling context, where manufacturers of industrial materials hire outside independent sales organizations as their representatives ("rep firms") to sell products to business customers. In return, rep firms receive commissions on realized sales. The question we address in this research is whether the observed commission rates are set at the optimal level, and if not, what are the economic consequences. This is different from most previous empirical contracting work which tests comparative statics predictions derived from theoretical models that impose optimality on manufacturers. A unique feature of the data is that we have a measure of salespeople's effort obtained from surveys. The effort data allow us to build a realistic model where salespeople have better information than the manufacturer about the opportunities in the field. Our empirical results show that optimal commission rates are twice as high as what are observed in the data, and that manufacturers could achieve greater profits by adopting the proposed rates.
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