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Essays on the economics of social in...

Hyatt, Henry Richard.

Essays on the economics of social insurance.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on the economics of social insurance.
作者:	Hyatt, Henry Richard.
面頁冊數:	164 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-10, Section: A, page: .
附註:	Adviser: David Card.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International70-10A.
標題:	Economics, Labor.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3383245
ISBN:	9781109456608

Essays on the economics of social insurance.
Hyatt, Henry Richard.

Essays on the economics of social insurance. - 164 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-10, Section: A, page: .

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2009.

This dissertation considers the relationship between social insurance programs and labor supply. I focus on government-mandated insurance for short-term and long-term disability. Specifically, I analyze the Workers Compensation and Social Security Disability Insurance programs. The first two chapters of my dissertation assess whether there is any evidence that employees who suffer workplace injuries are, in fact, credit constrained. If Workers Compensation claimants are credit constrained, then optimal social insurance models suggest a higher level of benefits. In the third chapter, I conduct a calibration exercise in which it is assumed that benefit claimants experience a large income effect from the provision of social insurance benefits.

ISBN: 9781109456608Subjects--Topical Terms:

212660
Economics, Labor.

Essays on the economics of social insurance.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-10, Section: A, page: .
500 $a Adviser: David Card.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2009.
520 $a This dissertation considers the relationship between social insurance programs and labor supply. I focus on government-mandated insurance for short-term and long-term disability. Specifically, I analyze the Workers Compensation and Social Security Disability Insurance programs. The first two chapters of my dissertation assess whether there is any evidence that employees who suffer workplace injuries are, in fact, credit constrained. If Workers Compensation claimants are credit constrained, then optimal social insurance models suggest a higher level of benefits. In the third chapter, I conduct a calibration exercise in which it is assumed that benefit claimants experience a large income effect from the provision of social insurance benefits.
520 $a In the first chapter of my dissertation, "The Effect of Workers Compensation Benefits on Labor Supply: Evidence of an Income Effect," I consider the well-documented phenomenon that higher Workers Compensation benefits paid for time lost from work discourage post-injury employment, which previous studies have considered the result of the distortion of the relative prices of consumption and non-employment. In a quasi-experimental framework, I exploit a legislative reform that changed the rate of Workers Compensation benefits for some workers but not others in order to assess whether the post-injury non-employment that occurs after Workers Compensation lost-time benefits are exhausted responds to the benefit level. Finding this post-injury uncompensated non-employment responsive to the benefit level, I conclude that there is a substantial effect of lost-time benefits on employment beyond that which can be explained by the distortion of the relative price of consumption and non-employment. This suggests that Workers Compensation claimants do experience a liquidity effect and so are credit constrained.
520 $a In the second chapter of my dissertation, entitled "The Closure Effect: Evidence from Workers Compensation Lawsuits" I use administrative data to test whether Workers Compensation benefits induce a liquidity effect by comparing the labor supply patterns of those who receive settlement for Workers Compensation benefits as a lump-sum to those who receive benefits over time. I find that receiving a court-approved lump-sum settlement is associated with an immediate increase in the labor force re-entry rate and an immediate decrease in the labor force exit rate. By contrast, those who receive court-approved settlement that does not formally close the claim, provides medical benefits as needed and provides non-medical benefits as an annuity do not experience a change in labor supply. The lawsuit being irrevocably closed clearly corresponds with an immediate and sustained increase in employment. I explain this surprising result as an effect of the "sense of closure" that claimants experience after their lawsuit has been settled irrevocably. This "sense of closure" effect dominates any liquidity effect that Workers Compensation claimants may experience.
520 $a In the third and final chapter of my dissertation, "The Optimal Level of Social Security Disability Benefits: Calibration of the Diamond-Sheshinski Model," I consider the optimal level of benefits in a situation in which social insurance provision plausibly induces a strong income effect: disability insurance. I modify the Diamond-Sheshinski model of optimal Social Security Disability Insurance in order to draw exact conclusions about the optimal provision of benefits. I demonstrate that, under weak assumptions, the optimal benefit level can be expressed as a condition of a few estimable statistics, including labor supply responsiveness to the payroll tax and benefit levels. Using existing empirical estimates, I find that Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits, as they exist at the time of this writing, are at an optimal level if claimants are reasonably risk averse.
590 $a School code: 0028.
650 4 $a Economics, Labor. $3 212660
650 4 $a Economics, Theory. $3 212740
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