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Rethinking commonsense psychologya critique of folk psychology, theory of mind and simulation /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Rethinking commonsense psychologyMatthew Ratcliffe.
其他題名:	a critique of folk psychology, theory of mind and simulation /
作者:	Ratcliffe, Matthew,
出版者:	Basingstoke :Palgrave Macmillan,2008.
面頁冊數:	p.
附註:	Originally published: 2006.
叢書名:	New directions in philosophy and cognitive science
標題:	Other minds (Theory of knowledge)
電子資源:	access to fulltext (Palgrave)
ISBN:	9780230625297

Rethinking commonsense psychologya critique of folk psychology, theory of mind and simulation /
Ratcliffe, Matthew,1973-

Rethinking commonsense psychologya critique of folk psychology, theory of mind and simulation /[electronic resource] :Matthew Ratcliffe. - Basingstoke :Palgrave Macmillan,2008. - p. - New directions in philosophy and cognitive science.

Originally published: 2006.

Commonsense Psychology, Theory of Mind and Simulation -- Where is the Commonsense in Commonsense Psychology? -- The World We Live in -- Letting the World do the Work -- Perceiving Actions -- The Second Person -- Beliefs and Desires -- The Personal Stance.

What is it to understand another person? A popular view in philosophy of mind, cognitive science and various other disciplines is that interpersonal understanding is a matter of attributing a 'commonsense' or 'folk' psychology, consisting primarily of an ability to attribute internal propositional attitudes on the basis of behavioural observations. The emphasis of recent debates has been onwhich mechanisms enable us todo this, how they arise during development and how they might have evolved, rather than on whether we actually do it at all. Ratcliffe disputes the shared premise on whichthese debates rest. He argues that 'folkpsychology', as generally described, is a theoretically motivated, simplistic and misleading abstraction from social life, which is wrongly asserted to be 'commonsense' or 'what the folk think'. Drawing on phenomenology, he offers an alternative account of interpersonal understanding. his account emphasizes a distinctive kind of bodily relatedness between people and the extent to which interpersonal interactions are regulated by shared social environments.

Electronic reproduction.
Basingstoke, England :
Palgrave Macmillan,
2009.

Mode of access:World Wide Web.

ISBN: 9780230625297

Standard No.: 10.1057/9780230625297doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

268471
Other minds (Theory of knowledge)
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

214472
Electronic books.

LC Class. No.: BD213 / .R38 2008eb

Dewey Class. No.: 150.1

Rethinking commonsense psychologya critique of folk psychology, theory of mind and simulation /
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520 $a What is it to understand another person? A popular view in philosophy of mind, cognitive science and various other disciplines is that interpersonal understanding is a matter of attributing a 'commonsense' or 'folk' psychology, consisting primarily of an ability to attribute internal propositional attitudes on the basis of behavioural observations. The emphasis of recent debates has been onwhich mechanisms enable us todo this, how they arise during development and how they might have evolved, rather than on whether we actually do it at all. Ratcliffe disputes the shared premise on whichthese debates rest. He argues that 'folkpsychology', as generally described, is a theoretically motivated, simplistic and misleading abstraction from social life, which is wrongly asserted to be 'commonsense' or 'what the folk think'. Drawing on phenomenology, he offers an alternative account of interpersonal understanding. his account emphasizes a distinctive kind of bodily relatedness between people and the extent to which interpersonal interactions are regulated by shared social environments.
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