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混合雙占下同質性受管制商品之競爭模式 = The Competition...

國立高雄大學經營管理研究所

混合雙占下同質性受管制商品之競爭模式 = The Competition Models for Homogeneous Regulated Products under Mixed Duopoly

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : 單行本
並列題名:	The Competition Models for Homogeneous Regulated Products under Mixed Duopoly
作者:	許博彬,
其他團體作者:	國立高雄大學
出版地:	[高雄市]
出版者:	撰者;
出版年:	民100
面頁冊數:	53葉圖，表格 : 30公分;
標題:	混合雙占
標題:	Mixed Oligopoly
電子資源:	http://handle.ncl.edu.tw/11296/ndltd/98621524727719846708
附註:	參考書目：葉43-47
摘要註:	在公、民營廠商同時生產同質性受管制商品的混合雙占市場結構中，本文參考White (2002)，重新設定公營廠商之目標函數（社會福利函數）組合項目的權重，將公營廠商視為政府調控受管制產業混合雙占市場中民營廠商之市場行為的政策工具。再分別由數量競爭、Stackelberg競爭（公、民營廠商分別擔任領導者）、價格競爭與勾結等競爭模式，分別探討公營廠商的效率與市場規模改變，對兩家廠商之產量、價格、利潤與社會福利的影響。本文發現：在混合雙占的市場結構中，(1)不同競爭模式中，較有效率的民營廠商不一定會比較無效率的公營廠商獲得更多的利潤。(2)當公營廠商提升效率，所有競爭型態均會出現公營廠商利潤上升，廠商間利潤差距縮小；如市場規模擴大，所有競爭型態均會使得公、民營廠商利潤上升，社會福利上升。(3)對於受管制同質性商品，政府無法透過公營廠商引導出一個具有絶對優勢的最佳競爭模式。面對生產同質性商品之受管制產業，政府應採行何種競爭模式，只能依政治理念睿智抉擇了。 Consider a duopoly market producing regulated homogeneous product, in this paper, we refer to White (2002) to set the public firm a specific set of weight for the components of its social welfare function. By setting up the weight, the government may utilize the public firm as a policy tool and regulate the private firm’s behavior. We respectively discuss the Cournot competition, Stackelberg competition, Bertrand competition, and Collusion to investigate the effects on the two firms’ outputs, prices, profits, and social welfare while the change of public efficiency and market scale.Under the duopoly market structure, the findings in this paper are: (1) The efficient private firm does not always more profitable than the inefficient public one in all conditions of every competition model; (2) When the public firm raise its efficiency, the profit of the public firm will be increased, but the profit variance between private and public firms will be shrank in every competition model; if the market scale expands, profits of both firms and social welfare will be increased in every competition model; (3) For the regulated homogeneous product, the government can not induce a first best competition model by utilizing public firm as a policy tool.Facing the regulated industry producing homogeneous product, what kind of competition model should the government adopt can only depend on her political conviction and wise choice.

混合雙占下同質性受管制商品之競爭模式 = The Competition Models for Homogeneous Regulated Products under Mixed Duopoly
許, 博彬

混合雙占下同質性受管制商品之競爭模式 = The Competition Models for Homogeneous Regulated Products under Mixed Duopoly / 許博彬撰 - [高雄市] : 撰者, 民100. - 53葉 ; 圖，表格 ; 30公分.
參考書目：葉43-47.
混合雙占Mixed Oligopoly

混合雙占下同質性受管制商品之競爭模式 = The Competition Models for Homogeneous Regulated Products under Mixed Duopoly
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