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R&D補貼：救濟受FTA負面衝擊之弱勢廠商的一個可行方案 = R&D S...

國立高雄大學經營管理研究所

R&D補貼：救濟受FTA負面衝擊之弱勢廠商的一個可行方案 = R&D Subsidy: An Available Alternative to Bailout the Uncompetitive Firm from Negative Impact of FTA

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : 單行本
並列題名:	R&D Subsidy: An Available Alternative to Bailout the Uncompetitive Firm from Negative Impact of FTA
作者:	蘇峻鋐,
其他團體作者:	國立高雄大學
出版地:	[高雄市]
出版者:	撰者;
出版年:	民100
面頁冊數:	52葉圖，表格 : 30公分;
標題:	自由貿易協定
標題:	Free Trade Agreement
電子資源:	http://handle.ncl.edu.tw/11296/ndltd/44815835387351082162
附註:	參考書目：葉46-51
摘要註:	本文主要係探討簽訂自由貿易協定前後之社會福利變化，我們遵循世界貿易組織規範條例中的不可控訴補貼方式，即以R＆D 補貼方式對三種不同情況下的社會福利造成之影響進行分析。(1)簽訂自由貿易協定後，本國政府與弱勢廠商皆無任何回應動作；(2)本國弱勢廠商自力救濟投入研發活動以提升自身競爭力；(3)本國政府採取研發補貼之政策，補助弱勢廠商投入研發之費用。藉由比較簽訂自由貿易前後之本國優勢出口廠商、弱勢廠商及社會福利之結果後，本文發現簽訂自由貿易協定可以改善本國出口廠商的利潤、消費者剩餘及社會福利；然而，本國弱勢廠商則會因外國廠商之產品進入本國市場而受害，且受害程度隨產品同質程度增加。本文也發現，簽訂自由貿易協定後，本國弱勢廠商可藉由投入R＆D活動來改善其競爭力，但處於不同產業的弱勢廠商，在面對不同的市場需求、價格及研發費用時，可策略性調整研發目標，以提升自身利潤及社會福利。最後，本文發現本國政府在社會福利極大化下，不全然需要補貼因簽訂FTA而受害的弱勢廠商，對特定產業類型的弱勢廠商反而要加以課稅，以提升本國社會福利。根據本文之研究結果，弱勢廠商從事研發，本國政府以最適補貼率來救濟（課稅）弱勢廠商投入研發之費用，乃是本文三個情境中的最佳方案。 This article focuses on the influence to the social welfare before and after signing free trade agreement. We following the non-actionable subsidies of the norms of WTO in R＆D subsidy to analyze the cases on the effect of social welfare. Case 1: after signing FTA, the government and uncompetitive firm both stay in inertia state. Case 2: the uncompetitive firm struggle alone by investing R＆D to raise its own competition. Case 3: the government adopts R＆D subsidy measures. We find that FTA can improve the profit of domestic exporting firm, consumer surplus, as well as social welfare. However, domestic uncompetitive firm will harmed according to the degrees of product homogeneous. We also find that domestic uncompetitive firm can improve their competitive status by R&D investment after signing FTA. In addition, we also find that the uncompetitive firm belongs to the different industry may modify its goal strategically to improve its own profit and social welfare.Finally, we discover that home country government has no necessity to subsidize the uncompetitive firm after signing FTA under the consideration of social welfare maximization. Instead she should even levy tax on the uncompetitive firm in a specific industry condition. We conclude that home country government should subsidize (tax) the uncompetitive firm’s R&D expenditure if it engages in R&D activities for enhancing domestic social welfare. Compare the social welfare of the three cases in this article, Case 3 is the best measure.

R&D補貼：救濟受FTA負面衝擊之弱勢廠商的一個可行方案 = R&D Subsidy: An Available Alternative to Bailout the Uncompetitive Firm from Negative Impact of FTA
蘇, 峻鋐

R&D補貼：救濟受FTA負面衝擊之弱勢廠商的一個可行方案 = R&D Subsidy: An Available Alternative to Bailout the Uncompetitive Firm from Negative Impact of FTA / 蘇峻鋐撰 - [高雄市] : 撰者, 民100. - 52葉 ; 圖，表格 ; 30公分.
參考書目：葉46-51.
自由貿易協定Free Trade Agreement

R&D補貼：救濟受FTA負面衝擊之弱勢廠商的一個可行方案 = R&D Subsidy: An Available Alternative to Bailout the Uncompetitive Firm from Negative Impact of FTA
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