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生產效率與垂直結構下之最適貿易政策 = Optimal Trade Po...

侯舜欽

生產效率與垂直結構下之最適貿易政策 = Optimal Trade Policies in a Vertical Structure with Production Efficiency

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : 單行本
並列題名:	Optimal Trade Policies in a Vertical Structure with Production Efficiency
作者:	侯舜欽,
其他團體作者:	國立高雄大學
出版地:	[高雄市]
出版者:	撰者;
出版年:	民100
面頁冊數:	43葉圖 : 30公分;
標題:	生產效率
標題:	Production Efficiency
電子資源:	http://handle.ncl.edu.tw/11296/ndltd/87874246168684772740
附註:	參考書目：葉34-35
附註:	內容為英文
摘要註:	在本文當中，我們重新檢視在垂直結構中生產效率對廠商進入的福利效果影響，更進一步在此框架中討論貿易和產業政策。首先，我們在一個連續寡占的數量競爭模型中，假設下游廠商中存在一個相對於現存者生產效率較低的潛在進入者，並考慮潛在進入者進入市場對社會福利的影響；發現生產效率存在一個範圍讓潛在進入者得以進入市場，而這範圍臨界值跟上游廠商家數成反比，跟下游廠商家數成正比；但就社會福利而言，潛在者進入市場後整體社會福利是提高的。其次，我們設定在一個兩國模型中，下游存在兩家有著生產效率差異廠商在本國，上游的獨佔廠商在外國；考慮上游獨佔廠商實行不同的價格政策的情況，我們發現在上游廠商差別訂價之下，本國的最適政策隨生產效率的降低由進口課稅變成補貼；在上游廠商單一訂價之下，最適政策為進口課稅，且不受生產效率的影響。最後，我們將兩國模型延伸到四國模型；上游的獨佔廠商在外國，下游存在兩家有著生產效率差異廠商在本國與對手國並將產品輸出至進口國，在上游獨佔廠商實行不同的價格政策的情況，我們發現在上游廠商單一訂價之下，本國的最適政策與對手國的最適政策都是進口關稅，且不受生產效率影響；在上游廠商差別訂價之下，本國與對手國在社會福利的觀點下皆採用相同的策略，並不受生產效率影響。 In this thesis, we first reconsider the welfare effect of entry in a vertical structure with production efficiency, and then further explore the strategic trade and industrial policies in such framework. The first chapter considers entry in a successive Cournot oligopoly where the entrant in final goods market is less production efficiency than the incumbent producers, and investigates how the production inefficiency affects the social welfare. It shows that there is a parametric space allowing potential entrant with production inefficiency, which is affected by the number of input producers and final-good producers. The critical value of entry condition range rise when the number of input producers is decreasing, and the number of final-goods producer is increasing; however, the welfare under entry is always higher than the welfare under non-entry, if the entrant enters the market. The second chapter considers the two-country model in which there are two firms with production inefficiency in the downstream country, one upstream firm in the other country. The upstream monopolist may charge the uniform pricing or discriminatory pricing. It shows that the tariff policy dominates the subsidy policy with lower production inefficiency under uniform pricing, however, when the production inefficiency is higher, the optimal policy is production subsidy. Under discriminatory pricing scheme, the optimal policy is an import tariff, and the welfare effect of production inefficiency in vertical structure is negligible. The third chapter extends the previous two–country model into a four-country setting in which there is one upstream firm in foreign country, two downstream firms with production inefficiency in each country, and there is one import country. The upstream firm may charge the uniform pricing or discriminatory pricing. It shows that, with uniform pricing, the optimal policy for both domestic country and foreign rival is the import tariff policy. Under discriminatory pricing scheme, both domestic country and foreign rival adopt the same trade policy from welfare point of view regardless of production efficiency.

生產效率與垂直結構下之最適貿易政策 = Optimal Trade Policies in a Vertical Structure with Production Efficiency
侯, 舜欽

生產效率與垂直結構下之最適貿易政策 = Optimal Trade Policies in a Vertical Structure with Production Efficiency / 侯舜欽撰 - [高雄市] : 撰者, 民100. - 43葉 ; 圖 ; 30公分.
參考書目：葉34-35內容為英文.
生產效率Production Efficiency

生產效率與垂直結構下之最適貿易政策 = Optimal Trade Policies in a Vertical Structure with Production Efficiency
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330 $a 在本文當中，我們重新檢視在垂直結構中生產效率對廠商進入的福利效果影響，更進一步在此框架中討論貿易和產業政策。首先，我們在一個連續寡占的數量競爭模型中，假設下游廠商中存在一個相對於現存者生產效率較低的潛在進入者，並考慮潛在進入者進入市場對社會福利的影響；發現生產效率存在一個範圍讓潛在進入者得以進入市場，而這範圍臨界值跟上游廠商家數成反比，跟下游廠商家數成正比；但就社會福利而言，潛在者進入市場後整體社會福利是提高的。其次，我們設定在一個兩國模型中，下游存在兩家有著生產效率差異廠商在本國，上游的獨佔廠商在外國；考慮上游獨佔廠商實行不同的價格政策的情況，我們發現在上游廠商差別訂價之下，本國的最適政策隨生產效率的降低由進口課稅變成補貼；在上游廠商單一訂價之下，最適政策為進口課稅，且不受生產效率的影響。最後，我們將兩國模型延伸到四國模型；上游的獨佔廠商在外國，下游存在兩家有著生產效率差異廠商在本國與對手國並將產品輸出至進口國，在上游獨佔廠商實行不同的價格政策的情況，我們發現在上游廠商單一訂價之下，本國的最適政策與對手國的最適政策都是進口關稅，且不受生產效率影響；在上游廠商差別訂價之下，本國與對手國在社會福利的觀點下皆採用相同的策略，並不受生產效率影響。 In this thesis, we first reconsider the welfare effect of entry in a vertical structure with production efficiency, and then further explore the strategic trade and industrial policies in such framework. The first chapter considers entry in a successive Cournot oligopoly where the entrant in final goods market is less production efficiency than the incumbent producers, and investigates how the production inefficiency affects the social welfare. It shows that there is a parametric space allowing potential entrant with production inefficiency, which is affected by the number of input producers and final-good producers. The critical value of entry condition range rise when the number of input producers is decreasing, and the number of final-goods producer is increasing; however, the welfare under entry is always higher than the welfare under non-entry, if the entrant enters the market. The second chapter considers the two-country model in which there are two firms with production inefficiency in the downstream country, one upstream firm in the other country. The upstream monopolist may charge the uniform pricing or discriminatory pricing. It shows that the tariff policy dominates the subsidy policy with lower production inefficiency under uniform pricing, however, when the production inefficiency is higher, the optimal policy is production subsidy. Under discriminatory pricing scheme, the optimal policy is an import tariff, and the welfare effect of production inefficiency in vertical structure is negligible. The third chapter extends the previous two–country model into a four-country setting in which there is one upstream firm in foreign country, two downstream firms with production inefficiency in each country, and there is one import country. The upstream firm may charge the uniform pricing or discriminatory pricing. It shows that, with uniform pricing, the optimal policy for both domestic country and foreign rival is the import tariff policy. Under discriminatory pricing scheme, both domestic country and foreign rival adopt the same trade policy from welfare point of view regardless of production efficiency.
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