國立高雄大學圖資館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

圖資館首頁

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Essays on bank loan contracts.

Hu, Yan.

Essays on bank loan contracts.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on bank loan contracts.
作者:	Hu, Yan.
面頁冊數:	141 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-04, Section: A, page: 1356.
附註:	Adviser: Connie X. Mao.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International72-04A.
標題:	Business Administration, Management.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3440082
ISBN:	9781124465357

Essays on bank loan contracts.
Hu, Yan.

Essays on bank loan contracts. - 141 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-04, Section: A, page: 1356.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Temple University, 2011.

Jensen and Meckling (1976) depict the firm as a nexus of financial contracts that offer optimal mechanisms to mitigate various frictions between agents, e.g., equity holders versus debt holders, principal versus agent, etc. In this study, we focus on two particular types of loan contract, performance pricing and revolving line of credit.

ISBN: 9781124465357Subjects--Topical Terms:

212493
Business Administration, Management.

Essays on bank loan contracts.
LDR:04521nmm 2200349 4500 001 309667
005 20111105132438.5
008 111212s2011 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781124465357
035 $a (UMI)AAI3440082
035 $a AAI3440082
040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Hu, Yan. $3 530968
245 1 0 $a Essays on bank loan contracts.
300 $a 141 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-04, Section: A, page: 1356.
500 $a Adviser: Connie X. Mao.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Temple University, 2011.
520 $a Jensen and Meckling (1976) depict the firm as a nexus of financial contracts that offer optimal mechanisms to mitigate various frictions between agents, e.g., equity holders versus debt holders, principal versus agent, etc. In this study, we focus on two particular types of loan contract, performance pricing and revolving line of credit.
520 $a Chapter 1 examines how default risk and accounting quality of borrowers affect the likelihood of using performance pricing in bank loan contracts. Consistent with the notion of negative hedging, higher default risk firms are less likely to use performance pricing loans. We also find that firms with poorer accounting quality are less likely to receive performance pricing loans. Stronger lender-borrower relationship that would mitigate information asymmetry and enhance monitoring, is found to be associated with greater likelihood of using performance pricing loans. In addition, we find that conditional on using performance pricing loans, firms with lower (higher) accounting quality are more likely to receive credit rating (accounting) based performance pricing provision. Furthermore, we document that the likelihood of receiving performance pricing loans is significantly reduced after borrowers' accounting quality deteriorates, e.g., after they restate their financial reports. These results supports the positive accounting theory, suggesting that a significant cost associated with performance pricing loans is borrowers' incentives to manipulate accounting information so as to obtain a lower loan spread.
520 $a Theoretical literature suggests that firms use lines of credit as a liquidity insurance to secure a desirable investment level in the event of future downturn (Tirole, 2005). In Chapter 2, we examine whether lines of credit provide liquidity insurance or simply convenience to firms via focusing on the drawdown rate. We find that drawdown rate is on average significantly lower than the imputed market rate on a bank loan given the financial condition of a firm at the time of drawdown, which supports the theoretical notion that lines of credit offer liquidity insurance. In addition, we document that stronger (or existence of) prior lending relation is associated with a lower drawdown rate, however bank reputation has no impact on the drawdown rate. Furthermore, we find that the impact of lending relation on the drawdown rate only exists in borrowers subject to greater information asymmetry. While we document that borrowers are penalized (paying a higher spread and more likely pledging collateral) on new lines of credit issued after their drawdown, they are penalized much less as they borrow from high reputation banks. Our results suggest that bank reputation and lending relation help provide a more efficient liquidity insurance, however via different channels.
520 $a Chapter 3 examines how a firm's performance pricing loans affect manager's incentive to manipulate earning. We find that firms with a greater slope or convexity in their performance pricing loans have significantly larger discretionary accruals. However, the positive association between the slope or convexity of PSD and discretionary accruals is significantly reduced as the lenders are of higher reputation or have had a prior lending relationship with the borrowers. These results suggest that bank reputation and prior lending relation serve as an effective monitoring mechanism, which in turn mitigates managers' incentive to manage earnings.
590 $a School code: 0225.
650 4 $a Business Administration, Management. $3 212493
650 4 $a Business Administration, Banking. $3 212413
690 $a 0454
690 $a 0770
710 2 $a Temple University. $b Business Administration/Finance. $3 530969
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 72-04A.
790 1 0 $a Mao, Connie X., $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Elyasiani, Elyas $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Naveen, Lalitha $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Krishnan, Jayanthi $e committee member
790 $a 0225
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2011
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3440082