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CEO after-tax compensation incentive...

Gaertner, Fabio B.

CEO after-tax compensation incentives and corporate tax avoidance.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	CEO after-tax compensation incentives and corporate tax avoidance.
Author:	Gaertner, Fabio B.
Description:	77 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-07, Section: A, page: .
Notes:	Adviser: Dan S. Dhaliwal.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International72-07A.
Subject:	Business Administration, Accounting.
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3454322
ISBN:	9781124633626

CEO after-tax compensation incentives and corporate tax avoidance.
Gaertner, Fabio B.

CEO after-tax compensation incentives and corporate tax avoidance. - 77 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-07, Section: A, page: .

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Arizona, 2011.

I examine the association between CEOs' after-tax incentives and their firms' levels of tax avoidance. Economic theory holds that firms should compensate CEOs on an after-tax basis when the expected tax savings generated from incentive alignment outweigh the incremental compensation demanded by CEOs for bearing additional tax-related compensation risk. Using publicly available data, I estimate CEOs' after-tax incentives and find a negative relation between the use of after-tax incentives and effective tax rates. While the results suggest that greater use of after-tax measures in CEO compensation leads to higher tax savings, it is possible that these savings will lead to lower pre-tax returns, or implicit taxes. Therefore, I also examine the association between the use of after-tax incentives and implicit taxes and find a positive association between the two. Finally, I find a significant positive relation between after-tax incentives and total CEO compensation, suggesting that CEOs who are compensated after-tax demand a premium for the additional risk they bear.

ISBN: 9781124633626Subjects--Topical Terms:

227519
Business Administration, Accounting.

CEO after-tax compensation incentives and corporate tax avoidance.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-07, Section: A, page: .
500 $a Adviser: Dan S. Dhaliwal.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Arizona, 2011.
520 $a I examine the association between CEOs' after-tax incentives and their firms' levels of tax avoidance. Economic theory holds that firms should compensate CEOs on an after-tax basis when the expected tax savings generated from incentive alignment outweigh the incremental compensation demanded by CEOs for bearing additional tax-related compensation risk. Using publicly available data, I estimate CEOs' after-tax incentives and find a negative relation between the use of after-tax incentives and effective tax rates. While the results suggest that greater use of after-tax measures in CEO compensation leads to higher tax savings, it is possible that these savings will lead to lower pre-tax returns, or implicit taxes. Therefore, I also examine the association between the use of after-tax incentives and implicit taxes and find a positive association between the two. Finally, I find a significant positive relation between after-tax incentives and total CEO compensation, suggesting that CEOs who are compensated after-tax demand a premium for the additional risk they bear.
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