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When Are Signing Bonuses More than J...
~
Choi, Jongwoon.
When Are Signing Bonuses More than Just "Pay to Play"? An Experimental Investigation.
紀錄類型:
書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:
When Are Signing Bonuses More than Just "Pay to Play"? An Experimental Investigation.
作者:
Choi, Jongwoon.
面頁冊數:
167 p.
附註:
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-10, Section: A, page: .
附註:
Adviser: Kristy Towry.
Contained By:
Dissertation Abstracts International72-10A.
標題:
Business Administration, Accounting.
電子資源:
http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3461950
ISBN:
9781124765945
When Are Signing Bonuses More than Just "Pay to Play"? An Experimental Investigation.
Choi, Jongwoon.
When Are Signing Bonuses More than Just "Pay to Play"? An Experimental Investigation.
- 167 p.
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-10, Section: A, page: .
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Emory University, 2011.
I investigate the conditions under which offering a signing bonus positively affects worker effort. Extant research highlights the potential for trust to function as a mechanism by which a signing bonus offer can positively affect effort. However, the efficacy of trust serving this role hinges on workers' attributions for the signing bonus offer. I posit that labor market competition---whether there is an excess demand for labor or an excess supply of labor---affects these attributions. Specifically, I predict and find that offering a signing bonus more positively affects both workers' beliefs regarding the employer's trust in them as well as their effort when there is excess supply than when there is excess demand. However, I also find that the benefits of offering a signing bonus are short-lived due to the higher effort expectations that accompany a signing bonus offer when there is an excess supply of labor, and the lower propensity for workers receiving a signing bonus when there is excess supply to fulfill those expectations relative to workers not receiving a signing bonus or workers receiving a signing bonus when there is excess demand.
ISBN: 9781124765945Subjects--Topical Terms:
227519
Business Administration, Accounting.
When Are Signing Bonuses More than Just "Pay to Play"? An Experimental Investigation.
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