國立高雄大學圖資館 |

環保技術研發補貼，生產從量稅與國際貿易 = Environmental Technology R&D Subsidy, Production Tax and International Trade

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : 單行本
並列題名:	Environmental Technology R&D Subsidy, Production Tax and International Trade
作者:	吳哲安,
其他團體作者:	國立高雄大學
出版地:	[高雄市]
出版者:	撰者;
出版年:	2012[民101]
面頁冊數:	51面圖，表格 : 30公分;
標題:	生產從量稅
標題:	production specific tax
電子資源:	http://handle.ncl.edu.tw/11296/ndltd/10587291936627490764
附註:	106年10月31日公開
附註:	參考書目：面45-47
其他題名:	環保技術研發補貼,生產從量稅與國際貿易
其他題名:	環保技術研發補貼生產從量稅與國際貿易
摘要註:	本文擬建立一個上下游的三階段賽局，在模型中，本國一獨占之污染原料供應商，將其生產之污染要素提供給生產同質最終財，並全數出口到第三國市場從事Cournot 競爭之本國與外國的兩廠商，藉以分別在上游獨占之污染原料供應商對兩下游廠商採取單一訂價及差別訂價下，比較本國政府的生產從量稅及減污研發補貼政策對上游廠商之環保技術研發行為的影響及其相關的福利效果。本文的研究結果發現，當本國政府採取生產從量稅時，會產生下游水平利潤移轉效果、下游的成本節省效果、上游的利潤減少效果、污染技術研發效果、污染減量效果等五項效果；而當本國政府採取減污研發補貼時，會產生下游水平利潤移轉效果、污染技術研發效果、污染增加效果。在污染原料供應商採取差別訂價或單一訂價下，本國政府採取最適生產從量稅政策的上游環保技術研發水準皆會低於採取減污研發補貼政策下的水準。當本國政府採取最適生產從量稅政策時，污染原料供應商採取差別訂價下的上游環保技術研發水準會低於單一訂價下的水準。當本國政府採取減污研發補貼政策時，污染原料供應商採取差別訂價和單一訂價下環保技術研發水準會相同。 We sets up a three stage game model to compare the level of environmental R&D and the welfare effects of the production specific tax policy with those of the environmental technology adoption subsidy policy. In the model, there is a vertically market where an upstream pollution input monopoly supplies the pollution inputs to the two downstream firms (domestic and foreign) to produce the homogenous products and then fully export them to the third market. In the first stage of the game, the domestic government by choosing the optimal production specific tax rate or the environmental technology adoption subsidy rate to maximize domestic social welfare, and in the second stage, the upstream monopoly sets the optimal pollution input price to maximize profit, and in the final stage, the two downstream firms play Cournot game to maximize their profit respectively. The main result of the project is as follows. No matter what price policy the monopoly input supplier adopt, the technology level under the production specific tax policy is always less than that under the environmental technology adoption subsidy policy.

環保技術研發補貼，生產從量稅與國際貿易 = Environmental Technology R&D Subsidy, Production Tax and International Trade
吳, 哲安

環保技術研發補貼，生產從量稅與國際貿易 = Environmental Technology R&D Subsidy, Production Tax and International Trade / 吳哲安撰 - [高雄市] : 撰者, 2012[民101]. - 51面 ; 圖，表格 ; 30公分.
106年10月31日公開參考書目：面45-47.
生產從量稅production specific tax

環保技術研發補貼，生產從量稅與國際貿易 = Environmental Technology R&D Subsidy, Production Tax and International Trade
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