國立高雄大學圖資館 |

不完全競爭市場下環境議題之研究 = Essays on the Environment under Imperfect Competition : 工會，租稅與區位選擇; Unionization, Taxation and Plant Location

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : 單行本
並列題名:	Essays on the Environment under Imperfect Competition
副題名:	工會，租稅與區位選擇
作者:	王文宏,
其他團體作者:	國立高雄大學
出版地:	[高雄市]
出版者:	撰者;
出版年:	2012[民101]
面頁冊數:	47面圖，表格 : 30公分;
標題:	民營化
標題:	Privatization
電子資源:	http://handle.ncl.edu.tw/11296/ndltd/50096432811004211146
附註:	106年10月31日公開
附註:	參考書目：面37
附註:	含附錄
其他題名:	工會，租稅與區位選擇
其他題名:	工會租稅與區位選擇
摘要註:	近年來，發展中的國家致力於保護環境和增進社會福利。本論文主要是在探討不完全競爭市場下環境政策的影響效果。文中將分別探討民營化，政府稅收偏好和環境政策對國內的產量、利潤、社會福利、環境與區位選擇之影響。在第二章中，當政府對有生產效率差與存在工會的廠商同時課徵排放稅和利潤稅時，我們發現:（i）在聯合工會之下，較低的利潤稅將導致較低的排放稅且廠商的產量會更高；（ii）當排放稅和利潤稅同時課徵時，聯合工會的工資將低於個別工會的工資，在聯合工會之下,它對環境的危害及廠商的利潤都將會高於個別工會情況。在第三章中，將政府對稅收的偏好加入具有工會之混寡市場中，我們發現:（i）在有工會的混寡且生產造成的污染時，當政府對稅收的偏好增加時，社會福利也會增加；然而，（ii）在有工會的民營化寡佔市場且生產會造成污染中，當政府對稅收的偏好減少時，社會福利將會增加;（iii）當政府的稅收偏好和廠商生產污染率都較高時，混寡之下的污染稅會高於純寡之下的污染稅。在第四章中，考慮污染稅之設計與廠房位置之距離相關時，我們發現:（i）如果生產函數為規模報酬遞減，較高的污染稅會使廠商的產出增加；（ii）不論生產函數為何種規模報酬類型，較高的污染稅會使廠房位置更遠離市區；（iii）當政府保護居民並對廠商課徵污染稅，將會提高居民的效用；（iv）無論規模報酬為何種類型，較高的污染稅會降低污染對市區的危害。 In recent years, developing countries endeavor to protect the environment and improve social welfare. This thesis mainly focus on the environment policy under imperfect competition. It explores how will privatization, government's preference of tax, and environmental policy respectively affect domestic output, profit, social welfare, environment and location. In chapter 2, when both emission and profit tax are imposed on the firms with productivity differentials and union, we find that (i) Under centralized union, lower profit tax will lead to a lower emission taxes and the output will be higher.; (ii) When emission and profit tax are imposed, the social welfare under centralized wage will belower than the one under decentralized wages, while the environmental damage and firm's profit under centralized wage will be higher than the one under decentralized wages. In chapter 3, the government's tax preference is incorporated into unionizedmixed oligopoly, we find that (i) In unionized mixed oligopoly withproduction-caused emission, social welfare increases with an increase ingovernment's preference for tax revenues.; However, (ii) In unionized privateoligopoly with production-caused pollution, social welfare increases with a decrease on government preference for tax revenues; (iii) When the government's preference and pollution rate are higher, pollution tax under unionized mixed oligopoly is higher than the one under unionized privatize oligopoly. In chapter 4 on the issue of plant location with distance-related pollution tax, we find that (i) The output level of the firm is higher as a result of a higher pollution tax, if the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale.; (ii) The plant location of the firm is further away from the CBD as a result of a higher pollution tax, which isirrespective of the type of return to scale.; (iii) When the government protects the resident and implements pollution taxes, it will increase the utility of residents. (iv), regardless of the type of return to scale. A higher pollution tax will definitely decrease the pollution to the CBD regardless of the type of return to scale.

不完全競爭市場下環境議題之研究 = Essays on the Environment under Imperfect Competition : 工會，租稅與區位選擇; Unionization, Taxation and Plant Location
王, 文宏

不完全競爭市場下環境議題之研究 = Essays on the Environment under Imperfect Competition : 工會，租稅與區位選擇 / 王文宏撰 - [高雄市] : 撰者, 2012[民101]. - 47面 ; 圖，表格 ; 30公分.
106年10月31日公開參考書目：面37含附錄.
民營化Privatization

不完全競爭市場下環境議題之研究 = Essays on the Environment under Imperfect Competition : 工會，租稅與區位選擇; Unionization, Taxation and Plant Location
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