自由進入寡佔市場下之進入模式,技術外溢與研發之研究 = Entry Mo...
國立高雄大學應用經濟學系碩士班

 

  • 自由進入寡佔市場下之進入模式,技術外溢與研發之研究 = Entry Mode, Technology Spillover and R&D in a Free Entry Oligopoly
  • 紀錄類型: 書目-語言資料,印刷品 : 單行本
    並列題名: Entry Mode, Technology Spillover and R&D in a Free Entry Oligopoly
    作者: 蔡佳志,
    其他團體作者: 國立高雄大學
    出版地: [高雄市]
    出版者: 撰者;
    出版年: 2012[民101]
    面頁冊數: 73面圖,表格 : 30公分;
    標題: 技術研發
    標題: R&D
    電子資源: http://handle.ncl.edu.tw/11296/ndltd/10207768451064699357
    附註: 內容為英文
    附註: 參考書目:面62-66
    其他題名: 自由進入寡佔市場下之進入模式,技術外溢與研發之研究
    其他題名: 自由進入寡佔市場下之進入模式技術外溢與研發之研究
    摘要註: 在本論文的第二章,我們試著探討技術外溢如何影響外國廠商的進入模式選擇,R&D程度以及消費者剩餘。除了授權進入模式之外,其他的模式中技術外溢程度越高則利潤的策略性效果隨之遞減。M&A進入模式之下的R&D投入程度最高且其實際應用技術程度為各模式之冠。當技術外溢程度在某個程度之下,外國廠商的最佳進入模式與本國消費者剩餘偏好是一致的。 在本論文的第三章,我們將Mukherjee (2012)的同質產品模型延伸至透過尋找既存廠商研發投資的最適選擇而將成本不對稱內生化。Mukherjee (2012)證明市場是否發生廠商的過度進入,取決於R&D的邊際成本之斜率大小。我們證明當供給面的技術外溢程度與需求面的產品差異程度交互作用時,在成本不對稱內生化的架構下市場將不會發生過度進入。這個結論回應了Mukherjee (2012)的論點,但不再強調R&D的邊際成本斜率角色。 在本論文的第四章,在內有結成策略聯盟的既存廠商,外有帶著R&D能力的新進入者的賽局情境之下,我們針對既存廠商與新進入者分別設計了不同的應對策略,並且演示了在內生化成本不對稱架構下廠商之間會達成雙贏局面。我們也證明了消費者剩餘亦有改善。此一來,既存廠商,新進入廠商與消費者之間迎向了三贏的局面。 In chapter two, we intend to explore how technological spillover affects foreign entry mode choice (Greenfield investment, JV, M&A, and Combination of licensing with export), R&D level, and the consumer welfare. We find that the strategic effect on profits decreases as R&D spillover increases in entry modes except licensing. R&D investment under M&A is always to be the highest one. Since the technology level in the industry depends on the individual firm’s investment, better technology is always chosen under M&A than other entry modes. For the foreign firms as well as the domestic consumer, the producers’ entry preference coincides with the consumer welfare when the technology spillover rate is in a certain range. In chapter three, we extend Mukherjee’s homogeneous product model (2012) and consider endogenous cost asymmetry created by the R&D investment of the incumbent firm. We show that if the spillover rate on the supply side intertwines with the substitutability between the products on the demand side of the market, then entry is socially insufficient in the endogenous cost asymmetry framework. This result echoes the findings of Mukherjee (2012), but it provides another new channel instead of pointing the role played by the slope of the marginal cost of R&D. In chapter four, we explore the possible strategies for the incumbents and the entrant, and demonstrate that those strategies lead to a win-win result in the endogenous cost asymmetry framework if the coefficient of cooperation and the given cost difference have a certain relationship. We also show that the consumer surplus is better off in the presence of non-drastic R&D. This suggests that the entrant doing non-drastic cost-saving R&D leads to a three-way win result and benefits the whole society.
館藏
  • 2 筆 • 頁數 1 •
 
310002292293 博碩士論文區(二樓) 不外借資料 學位論文 TH 008M/0019 301206 4424 2012 一般使用(Normal) 在架 0
310002292301 博碩士論文區(二樓) 不外借資料 學位論文 TH 008M/0019 301206 4424 2012 c.2 一般使用(Normal) 在架 0
  • 2 筆 • 頁數 1 •
評論
Export
取書館別
 
 
變更密碼
登入