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成本不對稱寡占模型下之外資持有、市場進入與租稅對消費者福祉影響之探究 =...

國立高雄大學應用經濟學系碩士班

成本不對稱寡占模型下之外資持有、市場進入與租稅對消費者福祉影響之探究 = Foreign Ownership, Market Entry, Taxation and Consumer Welfare in Oligopoly with Cost Asymmetry

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : 單行本
並列題名:	Foreign Ownership, Market Entry, Taxation and Consumer Welfare in Oligopoly with Cost Asymmetry
作者:	陳俊儫,
其他團體作者:	國立高雄大學
出版地:	[高雄市]
出版者:	撰者;
出版年:	2012[民101]
面頁冊數:	52面圖，格 : 30公分;
標題:	Stackelberg 競爭
標題:	Stackelberg Competition
電子資源:	http://handle.ncl.edu.tw/11296/ndltd/13835259527996058077
附註:	參考書目：面43-44
其他題名:	成本不對稱寡占模型下之外資持有市場進入與租稅對消費者福祉影響之探究
摘要註:	傳統經濟理論認為，當市場上競爭的廠商愈多，消費者福祉將會為之上升。Dinda 與Mukherjee (2011) 證明存在成本差異Cournot競爭模型及政府在社會福利極大下課徵從量稅時，競爭廠商數增加會導致消費者福祉下降。這樣的結論對政府競爭政策之制定與執行提出質疑。在本論文中，我們將分別討論在不同的市場結構及外資是否進入本國市場進行模型分析，並提出市場進出競爭政策之規範。　　首先，本論文之第二章在Stackelberg 競爭且成本不對稱之模型下，容許無效率廠商透過開放外資持股，降低生產成本以增加其在市場上的競爭力。我們證明無效率廠商之進入，依然可改善消費者福祉與社會福祉，並支持傳統的論述。另外，我們發現在廠商沒有進入成本之社會福祉必然高於有進入成本之社會福祉。　　其次，在本論文第三章我們同樣於Stackelberg 競爭模型中，假設所有廠商皆存在進入成本。一般而言，領導廠商的產出水準是大於追隨廠商的產出水準。透過政府開放外資的政策，追隨廠商競爭力提升來與領導廠商進行市場競爭，總產量也可能因此增加，進而提高消費者福祉。我們發現存在有一最適外資持股比例，消費者福祉將會高於未開放外資之消費者福祉；然而，社會福祉必須於追隨廠商數足夠多時，才可能高於未開放外資之社會福祉。　　最後，在本論文第四章利用成本不對稱之Cournot模型且政府決定最適稅率政策的情況下，無效率廠商之進入，依然可改變消費者福祉與社會福祉。接著我們就開放外資與未開放外資進行社會福祉比較，發現未開放外資之社會福祉優於開放外資之社會福祉。 It is generally believed that higher competition benefits consumers. In Dinda and Mukherjee (2011), the welfare maximizing tax rate in equilibrium is negative under Cournot Competition, and an increase in the number of less-efficient firms will lead to an adverse effect on consumer surplus. This thesis cast doubt on the robustness of their result under different market structure and foreign ownership. Firstly, in chapter two the case of no entry cost is introduced as a benchmark, and we examine the case of endogenous entry with foreign ownership under Stackelberg competition. In particular, we show that an increase in the number of cost inefficient firms makes the consumers better-off in the presence of foreign ownership at free entry. Secondly, in chapter three we first consider the case of fully restriction of foreign ownership as a benchmark, and then allow the government to determine the foreign ownership ratio. Assuming that the production cost of firm i decreases with a higher foreign ownership shares held by foreign owner and that will improve the efficiency, the consumer surplus will be increased associating with the entry of follower firms under Stackelberg competition in the presence of a welfare-maximizing foreign ownership policy. Finally, in chapter four we consider that foreign ownership improves the cost of inefficient firms and how would it affect the consumer surplus and social welfare in an oligopolistic framework. We find that the consumer surplus and social welfare are increased associating with the entry of cost inefficient firms under Cournot competition in the presence of a welfare maximizing tax/subsidy policy.

成本不對稱寡占模型下之外資持有、市場進入與租稅對消費者福祉影響之探究 = Foreign Ownership, Market Entry, Taxation and Consumer Welfare in Oligopoly with Cost Asymmetry
陳, 俊儫

成本不對稱寡占模型下之外資持有、市場進入與租稅對消費者福祉影響之探究 = Foreign Ownership, Market Entry, Taxation and Consumer Welfare in Oligopoly with Cost Asymmetry / 陳俊儫撰 - [高雄市] : 撰者, 2012[民101]. - 52面 ; 圖，格 ; 30公分.
參考書目：面43-44.
Stackelberg 競爭Stackelberg Competition

成本不對稱寡占模型下之外資持有、市場進入與租稅對消費者福祉影響之探究 = Foreign Ownership, Market Entry, Taxation and Consumer Welfare in Oligopoly with Cost Asymmetry
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