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混合寡占下之水平併購，外資進入與內生時間之課題研究 = Horizont...

國立高雄大學應用經濟學系碩士班

混合寡占下之水平併購，外資進入與內生時間之課題研究 = Horizontal merger, Foreign Penetration, and Endogenous Timing in Mixed Oligopoly

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : 單行本
並列題名:	Horizontal merger, Foreign Penetration, and Endogenous Timing in Mixed Oligopoly
作者:	王歆雅,
其他團體作者:	國立高雄大學
出版地:	[高雄市]
出版者:	撰者;
出版年:	2012[民101]
面頁冊數:	49面圖，表格 : 30公分;
標題:	水平併購
標題:	Horizontal merger
電子資源:	http://handle.ncl.edu.tw/11296/ndltd/71251026886828459709
附註:	參考書目：面39
附註:	內容為英文
其他題名:	混合寡占下之水平併購,外資進入與內生時間之課題研究
其他題名:	混合寡占下之水平併購外資進入與內生時間之課題研究
摘要註:	近年來，併購為現代企業在面臨國際化和自由化的衝擊下，所必須去面對的問題。由於併購熱潮的興盛，也引發了許多人對此類議題的研究。企業併購是現今企業家所要面臨成長挑戰時，不得不面對的議題，但需要注意的是，併購對企業整體策略為手段而非目標。第二章中，我們考慮在混合寡占市場裡有三個類型的廠商。假設廠商有個遞增性成本的規模經濟模型，每個廠商都是用相同的技術製造同質性商品。在未參與併購以前，民營廠商比國營廠商在生產上較具有成本效率性，相對來說，國營廠商的利潤也會比民營廠商的利潤還低。國營廠商和任何一間民營廠商進行併購時，就社會福祉來看，參與併購後的社會福祉會高於未參與併購前的社會福祉;社會福祉減少的缺口，是會增加國營廠商進行併購的誘因。此外,我們發現民營廠商之間進行併購時，併購後的社會福祉反而會下降。第三章中，在Stackelberg內生時間的併購後存在著三種情況下，包含了國營廠商和無外資進入的民營廠商進行併購、國營廠商和有外資進入的民營廠商進行併購,和民營廠商之間進行併購。在每一個情況中，我們發現都會存在著一個完美子賽局Nash均衡解(SPNE)。 In recent years, the mergers and acquisitions have become the focal issue in the presence of internationalization and liberalization. The rise of merger wave has led many economists to concern about merger issues. It should be noted that the merger on the corporate overall strategy should be taken as a mean and it is not the final target.In the first chapter, we consider a mixed oligopoly market in which there are three types of firms in the industry. We postulate that firms have increasing marginal cost and each firm produces the good using identical technology. Under pre-merger, due to that private firm is more cost efficient than the public firm, we first find that the profit of public firm is lower than the profit of another private firm. We next analyze the decision made by the public and both private firms on possible merge in the first stage of the game. The post-merger social welfare is large than the pre-merger social welfare when the public firm decides to merger with another private firm. Since the gap of social welfare decreases, it enhances the public firm’s incentive to merge. In addition, we find that the merger between the private firms, the social welfare after merger is lower than the social welfare before merger. In the third chapter, there are three scenarios in endogenous timing framework of Stackelberg after the merger, which are (a) public firm and a private firm without foreign penetration, (b) merger involving public firm and a private firm without foreign penetration, and (c) merger involving no public firm. We find that on each case it has an optimal Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE).Keywords: Horizontal merger, Endogenous Timing, Foreign Penetration, Mixed oligopoly

混合寡占下之水平併購，外資進入與內生時間之課題研究 = Horizontal merger, Foreign Penetration, and Endogenous Timing in Mixed Oligopoly
王, 歆雅

混合寡占下之水平併購，外資進入與內生時間之課題研究 = Horizontal merger, Foreign Penetration, and Endogenous Timing in Mixed Oligopoly / 王歆雅撰 - [高雄市] : 撰者, 2012[民101]. - 49面 ; 圖，表格 ; 30公分.
參考書目：面39內容為英文.
水平併購Horizontal merger

混合寡占下之水平併購，外資進入與內生時間之課題研究 = Horizontal merger, Foreign Penetration, and Endogenous Timing in Mixed Oligopoly
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