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Information Sharing in Supply Chains.

Ebrahim Khanjari, Neda.

Information Sharing in Supply Chains.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Information Sharing in Supply Chains.
作者:	Ebrahim Khanjari, Neda.
面頁冊數:	164 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-02(E), Section: B.
附註:	Advisers: Seyed M.R. Iravani; Hyoduk Shin.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International74-02B(E).
標題:	Business Administration, Marketing.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3527557
ISBN:	9781267619525

Information Sharing in Supply Chains.
Ebrahim Khanjari, Neda.

Information Sharing in Supply Chains. - 164 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-02(E), Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2012.

This thesis consists of three articles related to demand information sharing in supply chains. In the first article, I study the question of how non-pecuniary issues such as the retailer's skepticism and manufacturer's representative's social attitudes affect the retailer's trust in the manufacturer's representative. We construct a multi-period model where the actions of the manufacturer's representative (salesperson) affect both her immediate economic gain and her future credibility. In this model, the salesperson or the retailer can have different social attitudes. Our analysis reveals that, in such environments, salespersons with different social characteristics tend to be trusted in long relationships, provided their forecasting accuracy is higher than that of the retailer. Furthermore, while the presence of a salesperson can improve the profit of both the retailer and manufacturer, there are cost structures under which the manufacturer is better off without a salesperson, even one with good forecasting accuracy.

ISBN: 9781267619525Subjects--Topical Terms:

212494
Business Administration, Marketing.

Information Sharing in Supply Chains.
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520 $a This thesis consists of three articles related to demand information sharing in supply chains. In the first article, I study the question of how non-pecuniary issues such as the retailer's skepticism and manufacturer's representative's social attitudes affect the retailer's trust in the manufacturer's representative. We construct a multi-period model where the actions of the manufacturer's representative (salesperson) affect both her immediate economic gain and her future credibility. In this model, the salesperson or the retailer can have different social attitudes. Our analysis reveals that, in such environments, salespersons with different social characteristics tend to be trusted in long relationships, provided their forecasting accuracy is higher than that of the retailer. Furthermore, while the presence of a salesperson can improve the profit of both the retailer and manufacturer, there are cost structures under which the manufacturer is better off without a salesperson, even one with good forecasting accuracy.
520 $a In the second article, I study how the supply chain profits are affected when a sales-agent is hired by the manufacturer to boost the demand and where there is information asymmetry between the manufacturer and the retailer. Using a mathematical model, we find that as a result of employing a manufacturer-hired sales agent in the supply chain, under the fixed wholesale price contract between the manufacturer and the retailer, the retailer's profit can decrease as he learns more about demand. Furthermore, when the wholesale price is set endogenously, the retailer's profit can decrease in the efficiency of the sales-agent.
520 $a In the third article, I study a supply chain of durable goods consisted of a retailer with advance demand information and a manufacturer. I study how the policy of the retailer to share his information with the manufacturer depends on product durability. I find conditions under which the retailer shares information with the manufacturer and study the impact of information sharing on the supply chain profits.
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