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Capacity and Quality Contract Design...

Li, Linlin.

Capacity and Quality Contract Design in Supply Chain.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Capacity and Quality Contract Design in Supply Chain.
作者:	Li, Linlin.
面頁冊數:	175 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-02(E), Section: B.
附註:	Advisers: Seyed M.R. Iravani; Izak Duenyas.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International74-02B(E).
標題:	Business Administration, Management.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3527778
ISBN:	9781267622297

Capacity and Quality Contract Design in Supply Chain.
Li, Linlin.

Capacity and Quality Contract Design in Supply Chain. - 175 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-02(E), Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2012.

The rapid globalization of supply chains has provided unprecedented interactions between firms. The procurement process, once seen as a tactical function, has become strategic and is at the forefront of responding to and creating changes for companies. As more companies outsource production to contract manufacturers and rely on outside suppliers for critical components, production capacity and component quality have become two of the major concerns in supply chains. In the first phase of my Ph.D. research, I considered situations where firms buy options to use the capacity of suppliers. I explored whether suppliers should provide capacity option transfer rights to the buyers such that a firm can sell its unused options to another firm that may need more. I modeled and compared three policies for the supplier to deal with capacity transfer, and I provided managerial insights into when it is optimal for the supplier to allow transfer rights with the capacity options. I found that providing transfer rights to the buyers can be better for the supplier than reserving the transfer rights to itself in a majority of situations. Besides capacity, quality is another important issue in supply chains. In the second phase of my Ph.D. research, I considered a supply chain where multiple suppliers contribute to the assembly of a product, either through providing a part or through labor. The product fails if any of its components fails, but to find the faulty component can be prohibitively difficult. I studied the design of group incentives to induce suppliers to invest in quality improvement in several different scenarios taking into consideration of moral hazard and information asymmetry. I characterized the optimal contract design and examined its performance in these scenarios. Furthermore, I showed that sourcing multiple components from the same supplier can mitigate the issue caused by moral hazard but aggravate the issue caused by information asymmetry. Overall, I examined capacity and quality management in supply chains. I presented comprehensive modeling frameworks with which to evaluate contract design strategies, and provided managerial insights for companies to make full use of its capacity or to ensure its product quality.

ISBN: 9781267622297Subjects--Topical Terms:

212493
Business Administration, Management.

Capacity and Quality Contract Design in Supply Chain.
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