國立高雄大學圖資館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

圖資館首頁

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Essays in Supply Chain Management.

Northwestern University.

Essays in Supply Chain Management.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Supply Chain Management.
作者:	Wang, Jingqi.
面頁冊數:	150 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-09(E), Section: A.
附註:	Advisers: Hyoduk Shin; Baris Ata.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International74-09A(E).
標題:	Business Administration, Management.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3563900
ISBN:	9781303124259

Essays in Supply Chain Management.
Wang, Jingqi.

Essays in Supply Chain Management. - 150 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-09(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2013.

This dissertation contains three self-contained chapters. In Chapter 1, we consider a supply chain consisting with a supplier who invests in innovation to increase the value of products to consumers and a manufacturer who sells to consumers. We study three different contracts: a wholesale price contract, a quality-dependent wholesale price contract, and a revenue-sharing contract. We confirm that only the revenue-sharing contract can always coordinate supply chain decisions. However, the manufacturer's profit is higher with a quality-dependent wholesale price contract than with a revenue-sharing contract in some cases. We then study upstream competition between suppliers, and show that with the wholesale price contract, by inviting upstream competition, the manufacturer can increase his profit to the level at which he sets the quality-dependent wholesale price in a one-to-one supply chain. Furthermore, under upstream competition, the revenue-sharing contract is optimal for the manufacturer.

ISBN: 9781303124259Subjects--Topical Terms:

212493
Business Administration, Management.

Essays in Supply Chain Management.
LDR:03323nmm a2200289 4500 001 419275
005 20140520124009.5
008 140717s2013 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781303124259
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI3563900
035 $a AAI3563900
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Wang, Jingqi. $3 660304
245 1 0 $a Essays in Supply Chain Management.
300 $a 150 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-09(E), Section: A.
500 $a Advisers: Hyoduk Shin; Baris Ata.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2013.
520 $a This dissertation contains three self-contained chapters. In Chapter 1, we consider a supply chain consisting with a supplier who invests in innovation to increase the value of products to consumers and a manufacturer who sells to consumers. We study three different contracts: a wholesale price contract, a quality-dependent wholesale price contract, and a revenue-sharing contract. We confirm that only the revenue-sharing contract can always coordinate supply chain decisions. However, the manufacturer's profit is higher with a quality-dependent wholesale price contract than with a revenue-sharing contract in some cases. We then study upstream competition between suppliers, and show that with the wholesale price contract, by inviting upstream competition, the manufacturer can increase his profit to the level at which he sets the quality-dependent wholesale price in a one-to-one supply chain. Furthermore, under upstream competition, the revenue-sharing contract is optimal for the manufacturer.
520 $a We take the upstream supplier's perspective in Chapter 2. We analyze the supplier's optimal innovation decisions under the wholesale price contract or bilateral bargaining, with or without downstream competition. We also demonstrate that the supplier is better off using the wholesale price contract than using bilateral bargaining. Interestingly, the manufacturers' profits can also be higher with the wholesale price contract in some cases. In the bargaining case, surprisingly, the downstream competition hurts the supplier under certain conditions. Lastly, we show that a horizontal merger between two manufacturers may not always benefit them.
520 $a Chapter 3 considers warranty pricing for durable goods, taking product failures into account. Consumers are forward looking and solve a dynamic program to make purchase decisions. Due to the large number of products and remaining warranty lengths, the consumers' problem and the corresponding estimation problem are high dimensional. We introduce the so-called inclusive value processes to reduce the dimension of the estimation problem. We estimate consumers' preferences using the resulting structural model and individual level transaction data from an electronics retail chain. By conducting counterfactual experiments, we find that extended warranties are generally underpriced in our data set; and the optimal price differs by brand. Lastly, we explore the impact of product reliability on the retailer's profit.
590 $a School code: 0163.
650 4 $a Business Administration, Management. $3 212493
690 $a 0454
710 2 $a Northwestern University. $b Operations Management. $3 660305
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 74-09A(E).
790 $a 0163
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2013
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3563900

筆 0 讀者評論

多媒體

多媒體檔案
http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3563900

評論

新增評論分享你的心得

Export

取書館別