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Pathways of cooperation: Integrated ...

Ovodenko, Alexander.

Pathways of cooperation: Integrated and un-integrated international environmental governance.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Pathways of cooperation: Integrated and un-integrated international environmental governance.
Author:	Ovodenko, Alexander.
Description:	379 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-02(E), Section: A.
Notes:	Adviser: Robert O. Keohane.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International75-02A(E).
Subject:	Political science.
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3597533
ISBN:	9781303456589

Pathways of cooperation: Integrated and un-integrated international environmental governance.
Ovodenko, Alexander.

Pathways of cooperation: Integrated and un-integrated international environmental governance. - 379 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-02(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Princeton University, 2013.

This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.

Governments have incentives to form integrated rules and institutions when they pursue international environmental cooperation. Under what conditions do they form environmental cooperation consisting of un-integrated rules and institutions? I argue that governments form integrated cooperation when they share convergent preferences over cooperation. They form un-integrated cooperation when they have divergent preferences. Preferences diverge under one of two conditions: (i) economic actors ("stakeholders") responsible for the environmental problem operate in diffuse markets, or (ii) states have an asymmetrically interdependent relationship in managing the environmental issue. When neither condition holds, governments share convergent preferences over environmental cooperation. I evaluate the importance of stakeholder concentrations by studying patterns of cooperation on global environmental issues such as climate change, ozone layer depletion, biodiversity loss, and mercury pollution. I evaluate the importance of interdependence structures by studying patterns of cooperation on regional rivers, lakes, and seas. The analysis employs original data stemming from agreement texts, field surveys, primary-source interviews, field observations, primary texts, quantitative data, as well as secondary sources. Governments create integrated global environmental cooperation when stakeholders are economically concentrated. They create un-integrated cooperation when stakeholders are economically diffuse. On regional water bodies, governments form integrated cooperation when states share symmetrical exposure to pollution and other externalities. They form un-integrated cooperation when states have asymmetrical exposure. Neither the number of states with control over an environmental issue nor the wealth and geopolitical relations among states better explain patterns of cooperation on global environmental issues or regional water bodies.

ISBN: 9781303456589Subjects--Topical Terms:

174710
Political science.

Pathways of cooperation: Integrated and un-integrated international environmental governance.
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300 $a 379 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-02(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Robert O. Keohane.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Princeton University, 2013.
506 $a This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.
520 $a Governments have incentives to form integrated rules and institutions when they pursue international environmental cooperation. Under what conditions do they form environmental cooperation consisting of un-integrated rules and institutions? I argue that governments form integrated cooperation when they share convergent preferences over cooperation. They form un-integrated cooperation when they have divergent preferences. Preferences diverge under one of two conditions: (i) economic actors ("stakeholders") responsible for the environmental problem operate in diffuse markets, or (ii) states have an asymmetrically interdependent relationship in managing the environmental issue. When neither condition holds, governments share convergent preferences over environmental cooperation. I evaluate the importance of stakeholder concentrations by studying patterns of cooperation on global environmental issues such as climate change, ozone layer depletion, biodiversity loss, and mercury pollution. I evaluate the importance of interdependence structures by studying patterns of cooperation on regional rivers, lakes, and seas. The analysis employs original data stemming from agreement texts, field surveys, primary-source interviews, field observations, primary texts, quantitative data, as well as secondary sources. Governments create integrated global environmental cooperation when stakeholders are economically concentrated. They create un-integrated cooperation when stakeholders are economically diffuse. On regional water bodies, governments form integrated cooperation when states share symmetrical exposure to pollution and other externalities. They form un-integrated cooperation when states have asymmetrical exposure. Neither the number of states with control over an environmental issue nor the wealth and geopolitical relations among states better explain patterns of cooperation on global environmental issues or regional water bodies.
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