國立高雄大學圖資館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

圖資館首頁

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Military operational planning and st...

Martinez Ordonez, Lucia.

Military operational planning and strategic moves

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Military operational planning and strategic movesby Lucia Martinez Ordonez.
作者:	Martinez Ordonez, Lucia.
出版者:	Cham :Springer International Publishing :2017.
面頁冊數:	xiii, 101 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
標題:	Military planning.
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56108-0
ISBN:	9783319561080$q(electronic bk.)

Military operational planning and strategic moves
Martinez Ordonez, Lucia.

Military operational planning and strategic moves[electronic resource] /by Lucia Martinez Ordonez. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2017. - xiii, 101 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm. - Contributions to economics,1431-1933. - Contributions to economics..

Introduction -- Game Theory and the Decision-Making Process in Military Affairs -- Strategies and Tactics -- Conflicts as Zero-Sum Games -- The Advantage of Moving First Versus a First-Mover Advantage -- Irregular Warfare -- Modelling Specific Aspects of COIN Operations: On the Possiblity of a First Mover Advantage -- The War Against the Taliban: Tactical Operations and Strategic Moves -- Lessons Learned.

This book employs game theory to warfare and in particular to military operations. It aims at scrutinizing the validity of the two ideas that have governed the literature on war and warfighting: One is the Clausewitzian Fog of War, which suggests that he who is able to "see" through the gunsmoke and observe his opponent's moves before he has to commit to some strategy himself, should be able to gain an advantage over that enemy; the other is the tradition of understanding military conflict as a zero-sum game. Combined, these ideas seem to imply that war always gives rise to a second-mover advantage. This book questions the validity of this presumption at the operational level of military planning. It provides a simple but rigorous game-theoretic framework in order to analyse operational alternatives for a whole range of typical conflicts Western military forces are facing, including the most recent ones such as Anti-Access/Area-Denial and supporting host nations' counterinsurgency campaigns.

ISBN: 9783319561080$q(electronic bk.)

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-319-56108-0doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

785400
Military planning.

LC Class. No.: U162 / .M37 2017

Dewey Class. No.: 355.02

Military operational planning and strategic moves
LDR:02409nmm a2200325 a 4500 001 515121
003 DE-He213
005 20170503111555.0
006 m d
007 cr nn 008maaau
008 180126s2017 gw s 0 eng d
020 $a 9783319561080$q(electronic bk.)
020 $a 9783319561073$q(paper)
024 7 $a 10.1007/978-3-319-56108-0 $2 doi
035 $a 978-3-319-56108-0
040 $a GP $c GP
041 0 $a eng
050 4 $a U162 $b .M37 2017
072 7 $a PBUD $2 bicssc
072 7 $a MAT011000 $2 bisacsh
082 0 4 $a 355.02 $2 23
090 $a U162 $b .M385 2017
100 1 $a Martinez Ordonez, Lucia. $3 785399
245 1 0 $a Military operational planning and strategic moves $h [electronic resource] / $c by Lucia Martinez Ordonez.
260 $a Cham : $b Springer International Publishing : $b Imprint: Springer, $c 2017.
300 $a xiii, 101 p. : $b ill., digital ; $c 24 cm.
490 1 $a Contributions to economics, $x 1431-1933
505 0 $a Introduction -- Game Theory and the Decision-Making Process in Military Affairs -- Strategies and Tactics -- Conflicts as Zero-Sum Games -- The Advantage of Moving First Versus a First-Mover Advantage -- Irregular Warfare -- Modelling Specific Aspects of COIN Operations: On the Possiblity of a First Mover Advantage -- The War Against the Taliban: Tactical Operations and Strategic Moves -- Lessons Learned.
520 $a This book employs game theory to warfare and in particular to military operations. It aims at scrutinizing the validity of the two ideas that have governed the literature on war and warfighting: One is the Clausewitzian Fog of War, which suggests that he who is able to "see" through the gunsmoke and observe his opponent's moves before he has to commit to some strategy himself, should be able to gain an advantage over that enemy; the other is the tradition of understanding military conflict as a zero-sum game. Combined, these ideas seem to imply that war always gives rise to a second-mover advantage. This book questions the validity of this presumption at the operational level of military planning. It provides a simple but rigorous game-theoretic framework in order to analyse operational alternatives for a whole range of typical conflicts Western military forces are facing, including the most recent ones such as Anti-Access/Area-Denial and supporting host nations' counterinsurgency campaigns.
650 0 $a Military planning. $3 785400
650 0 $a Strategy. $3 176158
650 1 4 $a Economics. $3 175999
650 2 4 $a Game Theory. $3 737094
650 2 4 $a Military and Defence Studies. $3 739818
650 2 4 $a Operation Research/Decision Theory. $3 585050
650 2 4 $a Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences. $3 274083
650 2 4 $a International Humanitarian Law, Law of Armed Conflict. $3 558689
650 2 4 $a Terrorism and Political Violence. $3 740222
710 2 $a SpringerLink (Online service) $3 273601
773 0 $t Springer eBooks
830 0 $a Contributions to economics. $3 557948
856 4 0 $u http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56108-0
950 $a Economics and Finance (Springer-41170)