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Essays on Innovation, Analyst Covera...

City University of New York.

Essays on Innovation, Analyst Coverage, and Corporate Finance.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Innovation, Analyst Coverage, and Corporate Finance.
作者:	Liu, Yang.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019
面頁冊數:	113 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-04, Section: A.
附註:	Publisher info.: Dissertation/Thesis.
附註:	Advisor: Wang, Jun.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International80-04A.
標題:	Management.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10936823
ISBN:	9780438508538

Essays on Innovation, Analyst Coverage, and Corporate Finance.
Liu, Yang.

Essays on Innovation, Analyst Coverage, and Corporate Finance. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019 - 113 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-04, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--City University of New York, 2019.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This dissertation consists of three chapters that encompass corporate innovation, analyst coverage, public firm disclosure, and institutional investors.Chapter 1: A negative relation between analyst coverage and firm innovation is documented by prior literature. I complement this finding by showing that this negative effect is driven by firms with little past innovation experience. I find analysts have a positive effect on patent output for innovative firms. The potential mechanism behind the positive correlation between analyst coverage and firms’ innovation could be that the efficiency (measured by patent value) is much higher for firms with larger patent portfolios if they invest in R&D This paper provides evidence that analysts have heterogeneous impact on different firms’ innovation.Chapter 2: Based on two quasi-natural experiments, I find that the informativeness of corporate disclosure increases in the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A), and the Risk Factor section of the 10-K reports, after the reduction of analyst coverage. Modification, document length and readability are three dimensions used to measure informativeness. My results show that disclosure informativeness and analyst coverage are complementary. The effects are more pronounced for firms with less analyst coverage.Chapter 3 (joint with Jun Wang and Qijian Wang) : We study the effects of passive institutional investors on corporate innovation. The existing literature has shown a negative relation between the two, and in some cases, no relation. When we apply the regression discontinuity design around the Russell 1000/2000 indexes reconstruction to come up with an exogenous variation of passive institutional investors, we find that more passive institutional investors bring more corporate innovations. In addition to the evidence that passive institutional investors bring better corporate governance practices, we show two more channels. Passive institutional investors reduce the overall CEO turnover probability and they are more discriminating in linking CEO turnover to relative performance. Passive institutional investors are associated with wide adoption of employee stock options and employee stock options foster innovation.

ISBN: 9780438508538Subjects--Topical Terms:

180005
Management.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Corporate disclosure

Essays on Innovation, Analyst Coverage, and Corporate Finance.
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